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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2003, the Supreme Court handed gay and lesbian activists a
stunning victory in the decision of Lawrence v. Texas,' which summarily overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick.2 At issue was whether Texas' prohibition of same-sex sexual
conduct violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In a powerful,
poetic, and strident opinion, Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-member majority, re-
versed Bowers, observing that individual decisions regarding physical intimacy be-
tween consenting adults, either of the same or opposite sex, are constitutionally pro-
tected, and thus fall outside of the reach of state intervention.' Volumes can be written
about the decision; it represents a culmination of nearly a century's worth of work
in dismantling prejudicial views on gays and lesbians in American law and, indeed,
the rest of the world.4
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author would
like to thank the following colleagues for helpful comments and conversation: Michelle
Adams, Carlos Ball, Mary Anne Case, Chai Feldblum, James Fleming, Sheila Foster, Abner
Greene, Tracy Higgins, Angela Harris, Nan Hunter, Sital Kalantry, Jane Larson, Robin
Lenhardt, Esther Lucero, Catherine Powell, Darren Rosenblum, Holly Tahvonen, and Benjamin
Zipursky. Special thanks to Michael Stein for inviting me to this symposium at William &
Mary School of Law and to the Center for Gay and Lesbian Studies, where I co-taught a
Sexuality, Media Studies, and Performance Series with Carmelyn Malalis. I thank John Alan
Farmer, Genevieve Blake, Heather Burke, Jayson Mallie, Ethan Notkin, and Sheila Cockburn
for very helpful research assistance on this project.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.
4 For some examples of scholarship on the decision, see Paris R. Baldacci, Lawrence
and Ganner: The Love (Or at Least Sexual Attraction) that Finally Dared Speak Its Name,
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10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 289 (2004); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental
Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1184 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme
Court's Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1097 (2004); Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140 (2004);
Mary Anne Case, Of "This" and "That" in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SuP. CT. REV. 75; Matthew
Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 23 (2005); Benjamin J. Cooper, Loose Not the Floodgates, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
311 (2004); Paisley Currah, The Other "Sex" in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L.J. 321 (2004); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial
Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021 (2004); James E.
Fleming, Lawrence's Republic, 39 TULSA L. REV. 563 (2004); Edward B. Foley, Is Lawrence
Still Good Law?, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1133 (2004); Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The
Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLuM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Morals-Based Justificationsfor Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004); Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philosopher-Kings
Adopt Libertarianism as Our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional Morality
as a Basis for Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139 (2004); Bernard E. Harcourt, "You are entering
a gay and lesbian-free zone": On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-)
Queers, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503 (2004); Berta E. Hermindez-Truyol, Querying
Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151 (2004); Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution:
Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter andLawrence, 12 WM. &MARYBILLRTS. J. 65 (2003);
Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan,
Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447 (2004); Nancy J. Knauer, Lawrence v. Texas:
When "Profound and Deep Convictions" Collide With Liberty Interests, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L.J. 325 (2004); Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions After
Lawrence v. Texas, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265 (2004); Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence's Penumbra,
88 MINN. L. REV. 1171 (2004); Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider
Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of Foreign and International Law
in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 (2004); Arnold H. Loewy,
Morals Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA. L. REV. 159 (2003); Nelson Lund
& John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555
(2004); Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v. Texas,
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1081 (2004); Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L.J. 337 (2004); Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence,
and the Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1312 (2004); Richard
D. Mohr, The Shag-a-delic Supreme Court: "Anal Sex," "Mystery, " "Destiny," and the "Trans-
cendent" in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 365 (2004); Ruthann Robson,
The Missing Word in Lawrence v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 397 (2004); Louis
Michael Seidman, Out of Bounds, 65 OHIo ST. L.J. 1329 (2004); Andrew J. Seligsohn, Choosing
Liberty Over Equality and Sacrificing Both: Equal Protection and Due Process in Lawrence
v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 411 (2004); Edward Stein, Introducing Lawrence v.
Texas: Some Background and a Glimpse of the Future, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 263
(2004); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and the Boundaries of Sexual Privacy
After Lawrence v. Texas, 54 DEPAuL L. REV. 671 (2005); Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Same-
Sex Marriage and the Constitution: What Is Protected and Why?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 667
(2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059 (2004); Cass R.
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For a moment, civil rights activists took in an unusual turn of events: the Supreme
Court, largely regarded as conservative, unwittingly unleashed a firestorm of contro-
versy by refusing to differentiate between the intimacy enjoyed by same-sex and
opposite-sex couples, and by attaching a protective cover of liberty to each.' This
very act of equivocation was edifying, profoundly courageous, and, for some legal
scholars, ultimately reminiscent of the era just after Brown v. Board of Education.6
At the same time that the decision corrected a grave injustice, it gave rise to a
curious host of criticism and discomfort from parts of the American public, the ma-
jority of which had previously, and quietly, favored decriminalizing same-sex sexual
activity. While supporters of gay and lesbian rights rejoiced in a stunning triumph
of corrective justice, antigay advocates seemed to discover a new battle cry, vocally
warning the American public that Lawrence had suddenly, unwittingly, opened the
door to a cavalcade of undesirable outcomes.7 In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia
Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? OfAutonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003
SUP. CT. REV. 276; Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight"
that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1893 (2004); Francisco Valdes, Anomalies,
Warts and All: Four Score of Liberty, Privacy and Equality, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341 (2004);
Jami Weinstein & Tobyn DeMarco, Challenging Dissent: The Ontology andLogic ofLawrence
v. Texas, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 423 (2004); David Zucco, Introduction to Symposium:
Gay Rights After Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1017 (2004).
' Note, however, that Justice Powell had long publicly regarded his tie-breaking vote in
Bowers as one of his most regrettable decisions. See Ronald Turner, Traditionalism, Majori-
tarian Morality, and the Homosexual Sodomy Issue: The Journey from Bowers to Lawrence,
53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 53 n.341 (2004) (citing Powell's statement at a law school appearance
that his vote in Bowers was "probably... a mistake" and another statement to a reporter that
Bowers was probably inconsistent with Roe v. Wade); see also Robson, supra note 4, at 407
& n.52 (2004) (noting that Powell's concurrence in Bowers was - according to some case-
book authors - "a decision later regretted by Justice Powell who had thought that Bowers
v. Hardwick was not really an important decision").
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954). David Garrow noted in Newsweek that the Lawrence case "'may
be one of the two most important opinions of the last 100 years."' Evan Thomas, The War
Over Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 38. See also Nancy Gibbs, A Yea for Gays,
TIME, July 7, 2003, at 38. In another publication, Garrow claimed that "[a]ntigay evangelists
Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and James Dobson are now in the same league as [segregationists]
Lester Maddox and Strom Thurmond" after Brown. Chris Bull, Justice Served, ADVOC., Aug.
19, 2003, at 35, 36 (alteration in original).
' The Reverend Lou Sheldon, president of the Traditional Values Coalition, declared,
"People of faith are not going to lie down and allow their faith to be trampled because a
politically correct court has run amok ..." Thomas, supra note 6, at 38. One of the leading
conservative strategists, Paul Weyrich, observed that he has "'never seen people so energized
and activated, even more so than at the time of Roe v. Wade."' Jeffrey Rosen, How to
Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, § 6, at 48. In one much-publicized
poll, two months before the decision, 60 percent of respondents favored decriminalizing gay
sex; yet, days after Lawrence, that number had shrunk to 48 percent. Richard Goldstein, Get
Back!, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 12, 2003, at 32. Polls also showed that, after Lawrence, there
was a "sudden drop in the number of Americans who said that they would support civil
unions for gays and lesbians, from 49 percent in May to 37 percent in August." Rosen, supra.
For more discussion, see Susan Page, Gay Rights Tough to Sharpen into Political "'Wedge
Issues"', USA TODAY, July 28, 2003, at A10, and Susan Page, Americans Less Tolerant on
Gay Issues, USA TODAY, July 29, 2003, at Al. For a longer historical treatment on the rise
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vociferously complained that the majority "ha[d] largely signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda,"'8 and observed:
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in ho-
mosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters
for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boar-
ders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves and
their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and
destructive.9
Republican Senator Rick Santorum further predicted that if sodomy was legalized,
"then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the
right to incest, you have the [right to anything]."'
Elsewhere over the globe, Lawrence was met with a comparable mixture of
trepidation and satisfaction." While some gay rights advocates rejoiced in the United
States' decision to join a growing cadre of nations that had decriminalized laws
against sodomy (and in particular, cited the Court's willingness to draw on interna-
tional human rights jurisprudence to that effect), other governments took a different
route and used the opinion to signify a growing distaste with Western decadence.
One of Egypt's religious leaders proclaimed a newfound commitment to fighting the
"plague" of gay visibility, declaring his opposition to the appointment of gay clergy
and same-sex marriage.' 2 The Vatican, just weeks after Lawrence, issued a sweeping
declaration repudiating same-sex unions as "'gravely immoral,"' urging Catholics to
join in combating them. 3 And, in perhaps the most powerful example of this trend,
the Indian government offered a resounding defense of its own sodomy laws, claiming
in a recent brief that despite recent signs of tolerance in the West, "'Indian society
is intolerant to the practice of homosexuality/lesbianism,"' pointing out that such
"disapproval of homosexuality was 'strong enough to justify it being treated as a cri-
minal offence even where the adults indulge in it in private.""..4 The government,
of the gay civil rights movement, see Laura Secor, Rainbow Warriors, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
3, 2003, at El.
' Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602.
9 Id.
0 David Teather, U.S. Supreme Court Lifts Ban on Gay Sex in Texas, GUARDIAN (London),
June 27, 2003, at 13.
" See Ahmar Mustikhan, A Ruling Heard Around the World, PAC. NEWS SERVICE, June 30,
2003, http://www.alternet.org/story/16301.
12 Egypt Religious Leader Fights Gay 'Plague', Gay.com U.K., Sept. 9,2003, http:llwww.
gay.com/news/article.html?2003/09/09/4.
13 Vatican Fights Gay Marriages, CNN.com, July 31, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/
WORLD/Europe/07/3 1/vatican.gay.marriages/index.html.
14 Life Sentences Necessary "To Control Homosexuality" India Says, 365gay.com, Sept.
9, 2003, http://www.365gay.com/NewsContent/090903indiaSex.htm. See also All that Gays
Want Is Equality, TIMEs INDIA, Sept. 21, 2003; Allowing Homosexuality Will Lead to Delin-
quent Behavior: Indian Govt, Rediff.com, Sept. 8,2003, http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/
sep/08sex.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2003); Kavita Chowdhury, Centre Says Being Gay Will
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notably, reached this conclusion even in light of the ironic fact that India's sodomy
laws were enacted by British colonial regimes in the 1800s, not by Indians them-
selves. 5
These examples carry with them hidden and unstated implications for the recent
globalization of gay civil rights, forcing us to actively contemplate whether Lawrence
is yet another symbol of a global wave of change, or whether it represents an ulti-
mately unfulfillable goal worldwide, particularly in places where gay civil rights move-
ments have been met with considerable backlash. 6 For, as Professors Arnaldo Cruz-
Malav6 and Martin Manalansan have observed, "[q]ueemess is now global. Whether
in advertising, film, performance art, the Internet, or the political discourses of human
rights in emerging democracies, images of queer sexualities and cultures now circulate
around the globe."'17 They continue:
In a world where what used to be considered the "private" is ever
more commodified and marketed, queerness has become both an
object of consumption, an object in which nonqueers invest their
passions and purchasing power, and an object through which queers
constitute their identities in our contemporary consumer-oriented
globalized world.
18
Interestingly, as the "private" becomes more and more commodified, the role
of law has become much more central in defining the rights of particular sexual
minorities, particularly in times of tremendous cultural transition. The recent emer-
gence of gay- or lesbian-identified individuals in postcolonial contexts has created
complex ruptures in existing social fabrics, calling into question the universality of
legal constructs governing sexuality and culture. Throughout the globe, various social
norms, histories, symbols, and meanings create complex intersections with legal ca-
tegories of sexual identity. Three perspectives dominate. On one side, some govern-
ments view the advent of gay rights movements as purely "Western" phenomena,
devoid of local expression. On the other side, some global gay rights activists favor
a universalized understanding of sexual identity that risks erasing the diversity of local-
Remain a Crime, Its Reason: Our Society Doesn't Tolerate It, INDIAN EXPRESS, Sept. 9, 2003;
Swagato Ganguly, India's Sexual Minorities, STATESMAN (Calcutta), July 27, 2003; India Court
Petitioned on Sodomy Law, Datalounge, Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://www.sodomylaws.
org/world/india/innews33.htm; No 'Unnatural'Sex Please, We Are Indians!, HINDUSTAN TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2003, available athttp://www.sodomylaws.org/world/india/innews2.htm; Jyoti Sharma,
Why Should Homosexuality Be a Crime?, TIMES INDIA, Sept. 19,2003; Still Unnatural, TELE-
GRAPH (Calcutta), Sept. 12, 2003.
'5 All that Gays Want is Equality, supra note 14.
16 In other work, I have raised significant concerns about this global movement. See Sonia
Katyal, Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 98 (2002) (noting that many foreign
governments see the formation of gay communities as a foreign threat and have mounted
vocal and often violent attacks against gay and lesbian movements within their borders).
17 See QUEER GLOBALizATIONS: Cm SENsHIPANDTHEAFrERLFE OF COLONIALISM 1 (Amaldo
Cruz-Malav6 & Martin F. Manalansan eds., 2002) [hereinafter QUEER GLOBALIZATIONS].
18 Id.
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ized sexualities in favor of encouraging individuals to identify under the homogenizing
categories of "gay," "lesbian," or "bisexual" identity. A third group, largely composed
of social constructionists, favor particularized meanings of sexual identity and mean-
ing that can often fail to reference their larger political significance as part of a global
phenomenon.
As I will show, the pronounced risk of backlash against gay rights necessarily
forces us to contemplate the limits and possibilities of each of these prisms, parti-
cularly in terms of the boundaries between public and private space and the need for
cultural translation. I will argue in this paper that Lawrence offers us another way
that surpasses, and yet challenges, the perspectives offered by these different groups.
A close reading of Lawrence represents a culmination of a historic, and increasingly
global, convergence between liberty, privacy, and anti-essentialist theories of sexual
identity. Indeed, the ultimate significance of Lawrence lies not in its overt shielding
of sexual minorities from criminalization, but rather in its willingness to offer to the
American (indeed global) public, a version of sexual autonomy that is filled with
both promise and danger, fragility and universality. For, quite unlike Bowers, which
largely directed its judicial gaze towards gays and lesbians in particular, the court in
Lawrence carried a message of sexual self-determination for everyone, irrespective
of sexual orientation. At the same time, however, by examining the case law that
has flourished in its wake, we see that it has often been correlated with an implicit logic
of containment that has relegated the exercise of sexual autonomy to private, rather
than public, spaces.' 9
In the past, equality-based movements on the basis of sexual orientation have
historically focused on the trope of expressive identity, drawing upon comparisons
with race and sex for their persuasion.2" Within this paradigm, gay and lesbian advo-
cates often claimed that sexual orientation is like race, or that gay men and lesbians
are similar to racial groups, defined by an essence that is inalterable, fixed, immutable,
and, ultimately, fundamental to one's identity.2' Largely since Bowers, scholars and
courts have embraced this conception by defining the class of gays and lesbians by
a shared, public personality, rather than a particular sexual activity.22 Indeed, the most
successful cases for gay rights have unerringly utilized this public notion of gay
personhood, framed by reference to sexual orientation, as a central animating figure
"9 Cf. Case, supra note 4; Franke, supra note 4; Hunter, supra note 4.
20 Cf. Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (2000).
21 See Janet Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of Represen-
tation, in THE PoLrncs OF LAW 115, 121 (David Kairys ed., 1988); see also Sharon Elizabeth
Rush, Equal Protection Analogies - Identity and "Passing": Race and Sexual Orientation,
13 HARv. BLACKLETrER L.J. 65 (1997).
22 Rush, supra note 21, at 91; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, On Making Anti-Essentialist
and Social Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REv. 629 (2002); Janet E. Halley,
Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV.
1721, 1744 (1993); Katyal, supra note 16, at 111.
1434 [Vol. 14:1429
SEXUALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
in exploring other fundamental rights affecting speech, assembly, association, or the
right to participate in the political process.23
Yet Lawrence, by focusing on privacy and liberty, instead, has quietly and subtly
reoriented this project along a different and more convergent continuum that empha-
sizes the need for protection through the lens of autonomy, privacy, and liberty,
rather than the trope of expressive identity. Emerging from this decision is a vision
of sexual self-determination, what I call "sexual sovereignty," that represents the inter-
sectional convergence of three separate prisms: spatial privacy, expressive liberty,
and deliberative autonomy. 24 In creating a space for the convergence of all three fa-
cets, I would argue that Lawrence is a triumph - and a product - of anti-essentialism,
but its implicit logic of containment limits its potential to traverse both theoretical
and global divisions regarding culture and sexuality.2" Consequently, ultimately,
despite the power of its universalist vision, this Article argues that Lawrence is circum-
scribed by potential limitations wrought by culture, property, nationality, and citizen-
ship. Indeed, the example of India offers gay activists in the West a particularly rich
and cogent lesson regarding the limits of globalization of gay civil rights, one that re-
flects a deeper ambivalence and complexity regarding the convergence of law, culture,
and sexuality.
As Robert Post forcefully recognized, culture and law are locked in a compli-
cated, ongoing dialogue, one that inevitably produces a constitutional law that reflects
the contested and dynamic values that constitute culture itself.26 As Post observes, law
both arises from, and in turn regulates, culture as a result.27 But if the outcome in
Lawrence captures a key moment in the culture wars surrounding sexuality in Ame-
rica, then we should also confront its meaning and legal significance on a broader,
global scale. Lawrence's limitations and possibilities have been covered at great
length by other scholars; my objective aims to capture some of these ideas in order
to explore how Lawrence generates a global politics of tolerance, rather than a glo-
bal politics of equality.28 Yet, despite these limitations, I argue that Lawrence serves
as a starting point with which to build a theoretical model for global sexual auto-
nomy that encompasses many of the anti-essentialist critiques offered by human rights
discourse, critical race theory, and queer theory.
23 See ROBERT WINTEMUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 49 (1995); see
also Nan D. Hunter, Commentary, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1695
(1993) (observing that "the First Amendment has provided the most reliable path to success
of any of the doctrinal claims utilized by lesbian and gay rights lawyers."); Katyal, supra note
16, at 111.
24 See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 4.
25 Cf. Case, supra note 4; Franke, supra note 4; Hunter, supra note 4.
26 Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003).
27 Id.
2 See generally Eskridge, supra note 4.
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This Article, written for a symposium on the development of social movements,
first attempts to use Lawrence as a recent example of an emergent theory of "sexual
sovereignty," and second, attempts to predict what using this type of theory might
yield for similar battles that are being fought elsewhere throughout the globe, particu-
larly those which intersect with questions of culture, identity, and sexuality.29 Part
I of this Article turns to exploring the common problems of global gay civil rights
discourse, with special reference to India and its own debates regarding sodomy laws.
Part II discusses the tri-partite prism of Lawrence, arguing that Lawrence and its
progeny offer the public a vision of sexual self-determination that is deeply bordered
between public and private expressions of sexuality and desire. As I argue, India's
own treatment of sexuality and sexual orientation provides us with a fascinating ap-
plication of the limits and possibilities behind each facet of Lawrence - spatial pri-
vacy, expressive liberty, and deliberative autonomy - in a post-colonial context. I
argue here that although Lawrence may be culturally circumscribed by Western no-
tions of sex and sexual identity, its theory of sexual autonomy offers a vital shift -
from expressive identity to privacy and autonomy - that may be more easily trans-
latable to contexts that lack corresponding entrenchments of publicly heterosexual,
homosexual, and bisexual identities. While the legacy of Bowers forced individuals
to reclaim public spaces for gay and lesbian visibility, Lawrence, by creating a space
for the protection of private space, allows for a kind of sexual sovereignty that com-
prises the intersectional prism of privacy, autonomy, and liberty. However, as I show,
the limitations of this theory call for a much more dynamic interaction between the
sovereignties of the private and the public - in short, we must use the public to en-
hance the private, and vice versa if Lawrence is to be at all effective in a global context.
I. THE PARADOX OF GLOBAL GAY LIBERATION
As a preliminary matter, it is important to observe that there is no single "lesbian
and gay movement" in the United States; instead, there is a proliferation of different
and competing groups with widely different self-understandings, representations,
and political aims.30 Nevertheless, it can be said that the most prominent strand
which often presents itself as "the movement" involves organizations and individuals
that promote an agenda of equal rights and inclusion that is largely "premised on a
conception of gay men and lesbians as a clearly demarcated social group with a fixed,
29 Mustikhan, supra note 11.
30 Steven Epstein, Gay and Lesbian Movements in the United States: Dilemmas of Iden-
tity, Diversity, and Political Strategy, in THE GLOBALEMERGENCE OF GAY AND LESBIAN POI-
TICS: NATIONAL IMPRINTS OF A WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT 30-31 (Barry D. Adam et al. eds.,
1999) (observing that multiple movements over time with "widely different self-understandings
and political strategies" have included "homophile," "gay liberationist," "lesbian feminist,"
"gay rights," and "queer").
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ethnic-like identity."' 3' It is this "movement," circumscribed by the twin aims of cul-
tural equality and law reform, that I focus on particularly in this Article.32
Prior to Lawrence, legal treatments of sexuality in the United States tended to
actively ossify divisions between identities by focusing on the presence or absence
of fixed, declarative statements of sexual orientation. 33 Its governing theory, according
to Nan Hunter, drew upon a powerful and pragmatic notion of "expressive identity,"
the idea that one's sexual identity is both performative and representational, a politics
of presence.34 In these respects, the law governing sexuality has often presumed -
and thus imposed - a clear delineation of boundaries between homosexual, hetero-
sexual, and bisexual identities. As a result, laws which govern sexuality implicitly
presume that everyone is classifiable along some continuum of sexual identity; it serves
as a priceless index of human self-actualization. In the United States, as I and others
have argued in prior work, the emergence of this seemingly fixed and stable homo-
sexual identity became increasingly necessary as a means to successfully decenter
the import of Bowers v. Hardwick.35 In order to distinguish Hardwick's impact in
the equal protection context, scholars and courts began to embrace an alternate concep-
tion of homosexuality in which the class of homosexuals became defined by a public,
shared personality, rather than a sexual activity.36 Since then, the "class" of homo-
sexuals has become defined through the lens of gay personhood, which is deemed
a "central and defining aspect of the personality of every individual. '37 This index
of sexual identity - gay personhood - remains at the heart of the successes and
failures of the gay civil rights movement, generating as many definitional conundrums
as it has brought forth uncertain victories.38
3" Id. at 32. See generally URVASHI VAID, VIRTUALEQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF
GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION (2d ed. 1996) (arguing, among other things, that a gay and
lesbian movement pursuing social, legal, cultural and political legitimation emphasizes the
discrimination that gay and lesbian people face as a minority).
32 NICHOLAS BAMFORTH, SEXUALITY, MORALS AND JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LESBIAN AND
GAY RIGHTS LAW 65 (1997).
33 See Hunter, supra note 20, at 10 (noting the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy as
a prime example of how statements of sexual orientation become speech acts through which
one's legal status or material condition may be altered). For an extremely thoughtful treat-
ment of the benefits and disadvantages of using expressive identity in litigation, see Goldberg,
supra note 22. See also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free
Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 116-23 (1998) (describing
the divisions in communities and the costs inflicted upon the gay and lesbian community by
staying in "the closet," and by not openly declaring one's sexual orientation); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, "Closet Case": Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the Reinforcement of Gay,
Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility, 76 TuL. L. REV. 81 (2001).
3' Hunter, supra note 20.
15 Janet Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET 91
(Michael Warner ed., 1994).
36 See id.
" Id. at 92.
38 See Katyal, supra note 16.
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Part of this focus is historically attributable to the changing role of sodomy laws
in the nineteenth century, which slowly began to focus more on homosexual "persons"
rather than "activities."3 9 Whereas early classifications of homosexuality, for the
most part, concerned themselves with sexual acts, rather than sexual identities, later
disciplinary processes began to focus more on the homosexual as a distinct type of
person, a "species," rather than a type of behavior.4° Early court opinions, for example,
carved from the law a vision of a homosexual species, thereby willingly embracing
the notion that American society could be neatly classified into homosexual and
non-homosexual persons.4' In Bowers v. Hardwick, for example, the Court observed
that its opinion did not require it to judge sodomy (in general) or homosexuality (in
particular); instead, it circumscribed its query to ask only whether the Constitution
conferred the "fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. ' 42 By
carving out a particularized inquiry - focusing its gaze on homosexuals, as opposed
to society generally - the Court reified the notion that sexual identity, rather than
activity, marked citizens for both liberation and moral opprobrium, depending upon
which side of the line they fell.
4 3
In turn, the language of gay and lesbian liberation unwittingly assumed this un-
stated platform. Ever since Bowers, which foreclosed privacy protections for same-
sex sexual activity, strategies for lesbian and gay equality have tended to focus on
" Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 537 (1992) (no-
ting that in "'ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of forbidden acts; their
perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of them. The nineteenth-century homo-
sexual became a personage' (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 42-43
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978))). Hunter also explains that anti-sodomy "statutes that prohibited
the 'crime against nature' without defining it were challenged on grounds of vagueness, although
most were upheld with limiting constructions." Id. at 538.
4 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 39, at 43. According to Michel Foucault, whereas ancient civil
or canonical codes forbid sodomy as a category of forbidden acts,
[t]he nineteenth century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case
history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form,
and a morphology .... Nothing that went into his total composition
was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at
the root of all his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely
active principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it
was a secret that always gave itself away.
Id. See also Anne B. Goldstein, Commentary, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values:
Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988).
"' See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (characterizing a Canadian man as a"homosex-
ual" under section 1182(a)(4) of the 1952 Immigration Act and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1101 et seq., which excludes "[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality or mental defect").
42 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
4' Bowers brought forth a multitude of insightful critiques from both criminal and consti-
tutional perspectives. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 22; Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals:
The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103 (2000);
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1989); William J. Stuntz, The
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1,
7 (1997); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431 (1992).
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equality within public spaces - freedom of speech and expression, for example, is
often used as a principle to justify inclusion and protection in public events.' As
a result, gay civil rights, both inside and outside of the law, have become inextricably
permeated with an expressive, identity-based rhetoric. Group rights have become
the main platform to imagine gay equality after Bowers; the unavailability of privacy-
based strategies of liberation forced individuals out of the closet, into the streets, and
ultimately forged a visible, unitary view of the gay community. Under this visage, pub-
lic, expressive identity becomes everything - part and parcel of the language of both
discrimination and liberation.45
Yet this overreliance on identity-based paradigms of equality all too often illu-
minates a troubling paradox. 46 The seductive power of categorization - the notion
of gay personhood - tethers the very premise of liberation to the same categories as
those that originated in order to oppress. These categories - quite strategically -
either erase or overlook the rich and complicated tapestry of human sexuality and
identity, potentially excluding vast numbers of individuals whose self-perception
may fall outside of the interstices of gay, lesbian, bisexual, or heterosexual identity
categories.47 Often, categories of sexual identity assume a particular fixedness that
may often diverge from social norms, and may fail to play out in terms of one's beha-
viors, tastes, and social roles. As Hunter explains:
The civil rights claim remains the most powerful device for secur-
ing equality in American society, yet is premised on recognition
of a coherent group identity. What often goes unspoken in the as-
sertion of such a claim is the tension between the desire to decon-
struct the imprisoning category itself and the need to defend those
persons who are disadvantaged because they bear the group label.
48
Hunter's eloquent observation, I suggest, represents a critical crossroads for gay and
lesbian rights, particularly globally, where the language of gay liberation has often
faced audiences in other cultures whose social norms might actively challenge the
universality of such categories. In short, exceptions to the general categories of gay,
lesbian, or bisexual identity are everywhere, even despite their seeming clarity.49
44 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995); see also Hunter, supra note
20; Knauer, supra note 4, at 332 (noting that "[b]y the time John Geddes Lawrence and Tyson
Garner were before the Court, the homosexual had already emerged... as a politicized, orga-
nized, expressive, and sexual individual.").
41 See Hunter, supra note 39, at 1553-54.
46 See Katyal, supra note 16, at 128-29.
4' This is particularly true for the vast numbers of sexual minorities that adopt or express
gender variance, as I argued in Exporting Identity. See id at 133, 154-55; see also Currah, supra
note 4.
48 Hunter, supra note 39, at 546-47.
49 See generally Katyal, supra note 16.
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According to Eve Sedgwick, "modem Western culture has placed what it calls
sexuality in a more and more distinctively privileged relation to our most prized con-
structs of individual identity, truth, and knowledge." 50 Consequently, she adds, "it
becomes truer and truer that the language of sexuality not only intersects with but trans-
forms the other languages and relations by which we know."'', The growing tendency
among some global gay rights activists to traverse the globe and history, labeling
everything with hints of same-sex eroticism as evidence of "gay" or "lesbian" iden-
tity, reveals troubling unstated premises about the presumed centrality of sexual
identity over sexual activity. 52 At times, the language of identity, as applied to sexual
relationships between individuals, both in public and private spaces, can lead to global
difficulties in translation, particularly where the presentation of sexual identity is con-
cerned.53 Given that other cultures may have different social meanings for homosexu-
ality- or may lack reference points for such identities altogether- raising discussions
of gay rights in other contexts challenges and exposes many fundamental premises
upon which "the movement" is based. Consider, for example, the interesting taxo-
nomy of the term "homosexual," by one anthropologist studying parts of West Africa:
"Homosexual" is mainly used in describing a rather queer, femi-
nine man who likes to play the passive sexual role. Homosexu-
ality itself connotes transvestism and transsexuality. Although
there are many same-sex partners in West Africa, only a small
portion of them will identify themselves as homosexual. Sex be-
tween men is not automatically labeled as homosexual behavior.
4
10 EVE RosFOSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 3 (1990).
" Id. In fact, some scholars argue that the fact that sexual identity has become a "perma-
nent identity marker" separating the individual from the group is perhaps responsible for in-
tolerance of variations in the terrains of sexuality and gender in some western countries. GILBERT
HERDT, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT CULTURES: EXPLORING GAY AND LESBIAN LivEs 22 (1997).
52 LENORE MANDERSON & MARGARET JOLLY, SITES OF DESIRE, ECONOMIES OF PLEASURE:
SEXUAL1TIES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 25 (Lenore Manderson & Margaret Jolly eds., 1997).
5 For my definition of "homosexual identity," I rely on Richard R. Troiden:
The homosexual identity is a self-identity when people see themselves
as homosexual in relation to romantic and sexual settings. It is a per-
ceived identity in situations where people think or know that others view
them as homosexual. It is apresented identity when people present or an-
nounce themselves as homosexual in concrete social settings. Homo-
sexual identities are most fully realized, that is, brought into concrete exis-
tence, in situations where self-identity, perceived identity, and presented
identity coincide - where an agreement exists between who people think
they are, who they claim they are, and how others view them.
Matthew W. Roberts, Emergence of Gay Identity and Gay Social Movements in Developing
Countries: The AIDS Crisis as Catalyst, 20 ALTERNATIVES 243, 249 (1995).
54 Id. at 247.
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As the foregoing quotation illustrates, the constant interaction of a multiplicity of
different fragments complicates identity in various ways, a person's outward sexual
identity, their sexual orientation, their subjectivity, or sense of self, and the social
meanings that attach to each category.55 Contrary to the prevailing assumption that
individuals who have sex with members of the same gender are identified as "homo-
sexuals" or "bisexuals," there are numerous individuals who would never conceive
of identifying as such and yet routinely engage in same-sex sexual activity.56 As
Gilbert Herdt explains: "They may regard themselves as 'heterosexuals,' 'straights,'
or just 'human beings' who on occasion participate in homoerotic encounters for va-
rious reasons, including pleasure, money, social expectations, and the absence of other
sexual opportunities. 57
A. Revisiting the Closet
Consider the closet, the iconic symbol of the imprisoning potential of the absence
of gay self-identification among individuals who are attracted to members of the
same sex.-8 The closet, according to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, is "the defining struc-
ture for gay oppression in this century. ' 59 It comprises an intersection of both property
and privacy; its interior and exterior boundaries produce a type of protective enclosure
through confining and silencing, rather than creating the foundation for a more declar-
ative foundation of sexual identity. Sedgwick has deemed the closet to be "'a struc-
tured silence,"' pointing out that the silence becomes ruptured by the enactment of
the birth of the gay subject by "'coming out."'" The narrative from a closeted to a
fully self-actualized person carries with it a symbolic power that is almost magnetic;
Sedgwick calls the act of "coming out" a "salvational epistemologic certainty";6' that
is, the act of leaving the closet is dynamically poised to affect a person's transition to-
wards personhood by adopting an expressively gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgen-
dered identity.
The closet thus represents a convergence between two themes, both of which
suggest a crossing of borders; the first theme suggests a crossing from private to pub-
lic, and the second, less obviously, from absence to presence. Through coming out,
the spatial privacy of the closet, of interior, unnamed space, is also rejected in favor
51 Peter A. Jackson & Gerald Sullivan, Introduction to LADY Boys, ToM BoYs, RENT BoYs:
MALE AND FEMALE HoMosExuALrus IN CONTEMPORARY THAILAND 1, 19 (Peter A. Jackson
& Gerard Sullivan eds., 1999) [hereinafter LADY Boys].
56 HERDT, supra note 51, at 4.
57 Id.
58 See SEDGWICK, supra note 50, at 71.
59 Id.
o Roberto Strongman, Syncretic Religion and Dissident Sexualities, in QUEER GLOBALI-
ZATIONS, supra note 17, at 180 (quoting SEDGWICK, supra note 50).
61 SEDGWICK, supra note 50, at 71.
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of an expressive and declarative space; the private is rejected in favor of the public.62
By "coming out," one crosses the border from a "love that dare not speak its name"63
to gay self-actualization, gay personhood. What is invisible and therefore nonexistent
becomes visible, expressive and present: as a result, the personal declaration of "coming
out" becomes instead a politicized statement of personhood. "'If every gay person
came out to his or her family,"' an article breathlessly entreated after Bowers, "a hun-
dred million Americans could be brought to our side. Employers and straight friends
could mean a hundred million more."'
The dominant form of identity in lesbian and gay legal discourse has actively
embraced the need for this crossing from private to public, and thus involves, and
is often limited to, situations in which both partners define themselves as gay or les-
bian.65 However, as many social constructionist scholars have persuasively shown,
the development of gay personhood is relatively recent and figures far more promi-
nently in Western legal discourse than anywhere else in the world. 66 For in other con-
texts, as one activist pointed out, the claim to gay sexual identity, i.e., status is severely
punished, whereas same-sex sexual behavior, i.e., conduct, is largely tolerated, as
long as it takes place in private, and often without attachment to a particular identity.67
Thus, at the same time that the image of the closet remains a powerful comer-
stone of gay rights, over time and across boundaries, it might also be viewed as deeply
and inherently context-specific. Indeed, one might ask whether the architecture of
the "structured silence" of the closet varies according to cultural and social norms.
For at the heart of the fabled closet lies a predominantly Western assumption that a
gay, lesbian, or bisexual identity is a major determinant in the lives of all individu-
als. According to theorist Tom Boellstorff, a "coming out" narrative is premised on
a Foucaultian concept of power and confession, in which an identity can only become
authentic when it has been transferred to an external entity "who interprets and acknow-
",68ledges [the] confession. In other words, as I have suggested, liberation from "the
closet" suggests that a crossing from private to public is necessary for self-actualized
personhood and a fuller experience of the various dimensions of life, both personally
62 Id.
63 "I am the love that dare not speak its name" is the last line of a poem by Oscar Wilde's
lover, Lord Alfred Douglas, and is widely thought to refer to his homosexual relations with
Mr. Wilde. Lord Alfred Douglas, Two Loves, in THE CHAMELEON 28 (photo. reprint 1894).
Mr. Wilde was asked to explain the phrase during his 1895 criminal trial for "gross indece-
ncies." See Douglas 0. Linder, The Trials of Oscar Wilde: An Account, available athttp://www.
law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/wilde/wildeaccount.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
' SEDGWICK, supra note 50, at 71.
65 See STEPHEN 0. MURRAY & WILL ROSCOE, ISLAMIc HOMOsEXUALrHES: CULTURE,
HISTORY, AND LrrERATURE 4 (1997).
66 Id. at 4-5.
67 Interview with Surina Khan, Executive Director, IGLHRC (Dec. 14, 2000) (on file
with author).
68 Tom Boellstorff, The Perfect Path: Gay Men, Marriage, Indonesia, 5 GAY & LESBIAN
Q. 475, 496 (1999).
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and politically. 69 There is a caveat, however, because "coming out" is only valuable
if someone else acknowledges this crucial shift from private to public. Indeed, within
Western treatments of sexuality, Foucault has explained the imperative of the confes-
sional in this way: "[w]hether in the form of a subtle confession in confidence or an
authoritarian interrogation, sex - be it refined or rustic - had to be put into words. 70
Sex, then, becomes a central object of surveillance, of examination, of discipline.7'
The confession, for all its power, can only be effective if it takes place within the
context of a power relationship; one could only confess with the presence of an au-
thoritative figure who required and prescribed the confession.72 The authority figure
then "intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console and reconcile"; 73 and then,
in accordance with the prescription, the act of confession produces a desired modifi-
cation of behavior.74 Foucault further observes:
It is no longer a question simply of saying what was done - the sexual
act - and how it was done; but of reconstructing, in and around the act,
the thoughts that recapitulated it, the obsessions that accompanied it, the
images, desires, modulations, and quality of the pleasure that animated it.
For the first time no doubt, a society has taken upon itself to solicit and
hear the imparting of individual pleasures.75
In other words, expression is everything; it encapsulates the language of punishment,
domination, and liberation.76
69 See M.V. Lee Badgett & Lynn Comella, COMING OUT IN THE UNITED STATES: A SUM-
MARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 1, available at http://hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Get-
Involved&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlID=23970 (last visited
Jan. 24, 2006) (finding that "[pleople who are out in the workplace have higher levels of job
satisfaction, better relationships with coworkers, and lower levels of stress."); see also Interview
by Candace Gingrich with Tony Varona, former legal director, Human Rights Campaign,
available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Latinas Latinos&Template=/Content
Management/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD= 12759 (last visited Jan. 24,2006) (describing
how coming out enabled Mr. Varona to establish happier and more complete relationships
with his family and lead a more productive life at his law firm).
70 See 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 39, at 32.
71 MICHELFOUCAULT, POLMCS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE: INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS
1977-1984, at 111 (Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., Alan Sheridan et al. trans., 1988) [hereinafter
FOUCAULT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE].
72 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 39, at 61.
13 Id. at 61-62.
14 id. at 62.
71 Id. at 63.
76 Foucault continued in one interview:
It is often said that sexuality is something people in our societies dare
not talk about. It is true that people dare not say certain things. Never-
theless, I was struck by the following: when one thinks that, since the
twelfth century, all Western Catholics have been obliged to admit their
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As Charles Taylor has observed, our identities are shaped by both recognition,
the absence of recognition, and by misrecognition, all of which can result in "real
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves."77 At the same time,
Anthony Appiah has observed the seminal importance of ensuring that both the indi-
vidual and collective identity be viewed, not as limiting principles, but rather as emb-
lems that function in order to rework and recode negative stereotypes or culturally
insensitive expectations.78 Consider Appiah further:
Demanding respect for people as blacks and as gays requires that
there are some scripts that go with being an African-American
or having same-sex desires. There will be proper ways of being
black and gay, there will be expectations to be met, demands will
be made. It is at this point that someone who takes autonomy se-
riously will ask whether we have not replaced one kind of tyranny
with another. If I had to choose between the world of the closet
and the world of gay liberation, or between the world of Uncle
Tom's Cabin and Black Power, I would, of course, choose in each
case the latter. But I would like not to have to choose. I would
like other options.79
Taking both authors' observations, while the dynamics of confession might be
readily applicable to those familiar with its disciplinary imperatives, we do see some
difficulties in translating them to cultures which lack corresponding social norms,
due to differing conceptions of space, identity, and privacy. For example, some public
health activists have called the notion of a gay or lesbian identity "incomprehensible"
among some citizens in non-Western countries who fail to attach the same sort of
sexuality, their sins against the flesh and all their sins in this area, com-
mitted in thought or deed, one can hardly say that the discourse on sex-
uality has been simply prohibited or repressed. The discourse on sexuality
was organized in a particular way, in terms of a number of codes, and
I would even go so far as to say that, in the West, there has been a very
strong incitement to speak of sexuality.
FOUCAULT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE, supra note 71, at 102. Obviously, confession
also played a key role. Foucault explained:
Confession, the examination of conscience, all the insistence on the
important secrets of the flesh, has not been simply a means of prohibiting
sex or of repressing it as far as possible from consciousness, but was a
means of placing sexuality at the heart of existence and of connecting
salvation with the mastery of these obscure movements.
Id. at 111.
" Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) [hereinafter MULTICULTURALISM].
78 K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social
Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 77, at 159-61.
79 Id. at 162-63.
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identicative significance to same-sex sexual behavior."0 At least one public health
activist has suggested that South Asian families control one's behavior through honor
and shame, rather than Western cultures that focus more on guilt.8 ' Avoidance of
shame, meaning a loss of one's honor, may therefore be a governing factor in the
lives and choices of many individuals and families. 2 Here, the main emphasis may
be placed on public "visibility of behavior.... not the behaviour itself. '8 3 An exam-
ple of this is the emphasis placed on fulfillment of the institution of marriage, which
is often seen "as an essential requirement for maintaining the family, as a family duty,
as a sign of obedience to one's parents."'
As a cautionary caveat, I do not mean to suggest, normatively or descriptively,
that the alternative versions of sexualities I have offered are universally generali-
zable, nor do I mean to "essentialize" the underpinnings of Asian culture.8 5 Rather,
I only mean to suggest that there are both benefits and disadvantages to universaliz-
ing constructs of gay or lesbian identity across cultures, and that seemingly "estab-
lished" definitions of sexual identity and orientation often carry important exceptions
that may have legal consequences. As the boundaries between public and private
differ according to home, context, and community, so do cultural understandings of
sexual identity and expression. For example, though there is an emergent "gay" iden-
tity among some urban, middle class men throughout cities in Asia, some resear-
chers report that the concept of sexual orientation and self-identification as "gay,"
used to denote a broader psychosocial identification and acceptance of a sexual orien-
tation toward other men, often does not assume the central role that it is often accorded
86in many Western gay communities. Instead, occupation, class, and ethnicity may
often play determinative roles in the construction of one's sexual identity. 7 Here,
in stark contrast to the Foucaultian view of intersecting surveillance and sex, lesbian
and gay subjectivities do not hinge on the same concept of disclosure to spheres of
80 Jeremy Seabrook, It's What You Do, 328 NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Oct. 2000, available
at http://www.newint.org/issue328/whatdo.htm.
81 See Shivananda Khan, South Asian Male Sexual Behaviours and Their Impact upon
Male Children and Youth, NAZ Ki PUKAAR (Naz Found. Int'l, London, U.K.), Nov. 1997,
at 14 [hereinafter Khan, South Asian Male Sexual Behaviours].
82 Shivananda Khan, Cultural Constructions of Male Sexualities in India, NAz KI PUKAAR
(Naz Found. Int'l, London, U.K.), Jan. 1996, at 16.
83 South Asian Male Sexual Behaviour, supra note 81, at 14.
84 SHIVANANDA KHAN, KHUSH: A SHAKTI REPORT 31 (1993).
85 For some excellent observations on the dangers of "essentializing" Indian culture, espe-
cially in matters of sexuality, see RATNA KAPUR, EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS
OF POSTCOLONIALiSM 87-93 (2005).
86 See Katyal, supra note 16, at 157-58; Roberts, supra note 53, at 246; see also Debanuj
Dasgupta & Deep Purkayastha, Being in the Game: Perspectives of Married Indian Men Who
Have Sex With Men, TRIKONE MAG., Apr. 1996, at 10 ("'The debate around marriage and iden-
tity is different in India. Identity is based on caste, class and religious affiliations. Sexual desire
is not the focal point of our identities. Hence there is an acceptance of the multi-dimensional per-
sonality."').
87 See HERDT, supra note 51, at 20; Jan W. De Lind van Winjgaarden, Between Money,
Morality and Masculinity: Bar-Based Male Sex Work in Chiang Mai, in LADY BoYS, supra
note 55, at 199-200.
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home, workplace, or God."8 Such identities are "additive rather than substitutive:
opening them does not necessarily imply closing" other identities.89
These suggestions are notjust limited to cross-cultural variance. Indeed, the notion
of a "gay essence," or "gay personhood," which, according to author Diana Fuss, was
so relied upon to mobilize and to legitimate gay activism, has been soundly rejected
by social constructionist scholars who have dismissed the notion of a "natural, essential
or universal gay identity" in their own historic work.' Similarly, an ensuing proli-
feration of studies, both sociological and psychological, have also echoed the utter
inability of advocates of the "gay essence" to capture an emerging divide between
ideology and experience, act and identity across different cultures.9 Unlike the see-
mingly lucid nature of the sexual identities often referred to in case law, sexuality has
a number of psychological, biological, cultural, and behavioral elements that may
or may not correspond to the expressive domains of identity.92 Indeed, as one author
has pointed out, "what we define as 'sexuality' is a historical construction, which
brings together a host of different biological and mental possibilities - gender identity,
bodily differences, reproductive capacities, needs, desires, and fantasies - which need
not be linked together, and in other cultures have not been. 93
The closet represents a perfect binary framework for expressive identity: one is
either "out" or "in." But the explorations of sexualities throughout the world sug-
gests a radically complicated picture, one that suggests that individuals employ a con-
tinuum of different identities that differ according to the boundaries of private and
public, as well as context and community.94 Here, property and privacy play integral
88 See Boellstorff, supra note 68, at 496.
89 Id.
90 BAMFORTH, supra note 32, at 74.
9' MANDERSON & JOLLY, supra note 52, at 5; see also CONCEIVING SEXUALITY: APPROA-
CHES TO SEX RESEARCH IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 11 (Richard G. Parker & John H. Gagnon
eds., 1995); JONATHAN NED KATz, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY 97-98 (1995).
92 HERDT, supra note 51, at 40.
9' JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: MEANINGS, MYTHS AND MODERN
SEXUALrTIES 15 (1985).
94 For example, as I observed in Exporting Identity, in India, a growing body of public
health activists have observed the negligible utility of using the label "gay" or "homosexual"
to describe males who engage in sexual behavior with other males, preferring instead to use
the term "men who have sex with men" (MSM) instead. Id. Consequently, "the term is used
to denote those for whom homosexuality connotes a behavior, not an identity." Katyal, supra
note 16, at 153. The term MSM is used to refer "to men from all age groups, marital status, eco-
nomic classes, educational backgrounds, caste and religious communities, sexual identities, and
gender identities who engage in sexual activity with other men." Id. Many public health ex-
perts contend that use of the term is necessary for effective AIDS educative interventions, be-
cause MSM do not see themselves as bisexual or "gay," yet neither are they "'conventionally
straight."' Id. See also JEREMY SEABROOK, LOVE IN A DIFFERENT CLIMATE: MEN WHO HAVE
SEX WITH MEN IN INDIA 141 (1999); Shaffiq Essajee, Rocking the Boat: Anjali Gopalan's
Work With Men Who Have Sex With Men, TRIKONE MAG., Oct. 1996, at 7 ("Not to say there
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roles in constructing these boundaries; essential for the flourishing of human rela-
tionships, both inside and outside the objectively "gay" community.95 As Boellerstorf
concluded in his study:
We find not an epistemology of the closet but an epistemology
of life worlds, where healthy subjectivity depends not on integra-
ting diverse domains of life and having a unified, unchanging iden-
tity in all situations but on separating domains of life and main-
taining their borders against the threat of gossip and discovery.
96
Consequently, it is more appropriate to think of such complications in terms of their
unraveling effect on the notion of the gay essence, which becomes revealed as not
an internally homogeneous entity, but rather, an amalgam of multiple subjectivities
that the law governs, though somewhat inhospitably.97
A serious examination of sexualities reveals enormous complexities stemming
from the cultural dynamics surrounding identity - complexities that scholars and
activists often headily ignore, a response that others have critiqued as a kind of "lin-
gering imperialism of adjudging sameness and difference from" a Western perspec-
tive.98 A fuller study of same-sex sexual relations in other cultural contexts can be
understood only by reference to the wider structures of the society itself, including
its constructions of masculinity, femininity, heterosexuality, bisexuality, and the laws
(or lack thereof) which shape and construct these notions.9
are no gay men in India but this identity is sort of a luxury that doesn't really extend beyond
the educated upper classes. The majority of men who have sex with men don't see themselves
as gay or even homosexual."); Owais Khan, A Rose by Any Other Name. .. ? Gay vs. MSM,
TRIKONEMAG., July 2000, at 16; Deep Purkayastha, MSMNetworks: Identity Categories Versus
Identity Continuum, 27 NAZ KI PUKAAR (Naz Found. Int'l, London, U.K.), Oct. 1999, at 16.
" For a great discussion of the relationship between property and privacy and their rela-
tionship to sexuality, see Strahilevitz, supra note 4.
96 Boellrstorff, supra note 68, at 496.
9' See id. at 490.
98 MANDERSON & JOLLY, supra note 52, at 25.
99 See ANTHROPOLOGY AND HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR 159 (Evelyn Blackwood ed., 1986);
see also FEMALE DESIRES AND SAME-SEX RELATIONS: TRANSGENDER PRACTICES ACROSS
CULTURES (Evelyn Blackwood & Saskia E. Wieringa eds., 1999) (analyzing female same-sex
relations in a variety of cultural settings). Interestingly, some groups have therefore joined to-
gether in opposition to gay-identified groups, for reasons that stem from differences regarding
both gender and sexuality. A group in Calcutta, for example, known as Maitreya, has organized
and issued a statement against what they term "gender oppression" faced by males who do
not conform to the conventional definitions of masculinity. Maitreya, 29 NAZ KIPUKAAR (Naz
Found. Int'l, London, U.K.), Apr. 2000, at 4. Its press statement explains that "our oppression
is not always based on our sexualities, but on our gender affinities, though we firmly believe
that many among us who are not heterosexual face a specific stigmatisation as 'loving males'
is often conceived of as an unmanly thing." Id. Other members joined because they were bi-
sexually oriented and felt excluded from gay identity groups. See id. Another individual claims:
Most of us in Maitreya are bisexual or homosexual or those with fluid
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For example, while "the North American closet spells liberation through dis-
closure," one anthropologist writes that "many native Latin American homosexualities
operate through freedoms afforded by secrecy."' ° Part of this is due to the different
role of law in governing sexuality. According to anthropologist Roberto Strongman,
in sharp contrast to the United States' prior prohibition of sodomy, many Latin Ameri-
can states do not have constitutional prohibitions against homosexuality.'0 ' Thus,
whenever homosexuals are arrested, it is usually under charges of public indecency.'0 2
As a result, he explains:
Many native Latin American alternative genders and sexualities
do not rely on the same notion of disclosure to exist; the perfor-
mance of desire is a much more defining moment than the decla-
ration; the act is much more important than the speech-act....
Many native Latin American homosexualities still enjoy the
freedom of ignorance of the closet and thus operate sometimes
with greater liberties because that which isn't part of vox populi
is difficult for society to condemn.' 3
Adding to this point, "what is often punished in Latin America is not the homosexual
act per se, but the alleged disclosure of it in the public sphere as 'public indecency.'14
Consider a recent case from Colombia, which involved a law student and gay rights
activist who was repeatedly kicked by school guards who shouted anti-gay epithets
as he waited inside a university campus.'0 5 After his complaint against the university
went unaddressed, various letters of protest on his behalf were answered by the uni-
versity with the observation that "'exteriorization of sexual preference goes against the
University principles and will not be tolerated.""' 6 In other words, it was the assertion
of the identity, the act of naming oneself, or the "exteriorization" of sexual preference
that was singularly objectionable, rather than the tendency or desire to engage in same-
sex sexual conduct.
In contrast to the function of sodomy laws in the United States, which condemn
sexually "private" activities with a host of public repercussions on expression, employ-
ment, and otherwise, these other contexts actually suggest an opposite trajectory,
sexualities. We are among the thousands of males who have sex with
males in India and the rest of South Asia who are either uncomfortable
with putting a premium on their sexual identities or unable to subscribe
to the feminine male construction.
Id.
10o Strongman, supra note 60, at 181.
101 Id.
102 See id.
103 id.
104 id.
"3o See Int'l Gay & Lesbian Hum. Rts. Comm'n, University Guards Abuse Student in Re-
taliation for Complaints, July 2, 2001, available at http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/section.
php?id=5&detail=153 (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
106 Id.
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where the sexually private act is tolerated only insofar as it remains a nameless, be-
havioral facet of one's personality that is unconnected to larger forms of identity and
discrimination. In such contexts, the law opts to condemn public expressions of homo-
sexuality, rather than sexual acts in private. Within such contexts, as Strongman has
argued, the gay subject, through birth as the coming out narrative, also "forfeit[s]
some of the freedoms of not-being,"'' 7 such as personal security, safety, and an unwil-
lingness to complicate one's sexual identity or marriage by associating one's sexual
activity with a particular public persona.
The symbolism of the closet implicitly suggests that to deny one's expressive
sexual preference is an act of self-abnegation; a direct assault on one's identity and
personhood. The dominant narrative produced largely by gay and lesbian human
rights activists in Latin America, according to Strongman, builds on this theme by
seeking to homogenize alternative genders and non-heterosexual sexualities through
translating them into "a developmental model that positions them as backwards."'' 8
Adding to this point, anthropologist Martin Manalansan has pointed out that "gay
gains meaning according to a developmental narrative that begins with an unliber-
ated, 'prepolitical' homosexual practice and that culminates in a liberated, 'out,' poli-
ticized, 'modem,' 'gay' subjectivity."'19 Here, I do not mean to devalue the powerful
role that the closet has played in Western discourse, or to suggest its complete irrele-
vance in other cultural contexts, but simply to point out that some individuals might
not follow the trajectory offered by Western psychologists or activists; indeed, some
personal narratives may prefer to remain within the structured silence that the closet
offers, and choose never to equate their sexual preferences with a particular sexual
identity."0 Yet to unilaterally deem such individuals as somehow less politically
107 Strongman, supra note 60, at 180.
108 Id. at 181.
"o Martin F. Manalansan IV, In the Shadows of Stonewall: Examining Gay Transnational
Politics and the Diasporic Dilemma, in THE POLMCS OF CULTURE IN THE SHADOW OF CAPrAL
487 (Lisa Lowe & David Lloyd eds., 1997).
110 Strongman, supra note 60, at 181. Yet, on the other hand, the documentary narratives
established by anthropologists reflect equally problematic tendencies that are so deeply context-
specific that they fail to grapple with the larger political ramifications behind classifications
of identity. Strongman offers the example of studies of Latin American homosexualities which
rely on oppositional rhetorical strategies that focus on distinguishing between "active" and
"passive" homosexuals, in stark comparison to the "egalitarian" systems in the United States.
Id. Strongman writes that such descriptions demonstrate
a polarized distinction that mirrors, in the sexual arena, the problematic
images of tyranny and democracy that are used politically by the United
States to distinguish the representation of itself from Latin America. In
this way, gay discourse operates like other forms of imperialistic propa-
ganda in which the Other is reduced to an opposite of the values desired
to be represented in the imperialist self.
Id. at 181-82. Here, too, we might ask whether it is ever possible to describe localized sexual
practices without escaping the tendency to exoticize or to erase the political significance of
such practices in terms of the project of gay civil rights. Such difficulties in legal translation
have integral consequences for the globalization of gay civil rights in general and the con-
struction of sexual rights regarding citizenship in particular.
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advanced than other individuals who adopt the trope of expressive identity, is to risk
oversimplification and overlook the rich and complicated narratives many individuals
offer regarding their sexual identity formation.
B. Postcolonial Resurrections of the Closet
Though identities are complex, contingent, and always shifting, laws against
"unnatural acts" have, since colonial times, ironically tended to presume stability in
their governance of sexual activities and identities. At the first national workshop
on strategies to advance lesbian and gay rights in India in November 1997, a press re-
lease observed that "[w]hile homosexuality has been accepted in many Indian cultures,
the criminalisation of homosexuality has been an import from the West."" Curiously,
however, in more recent times, the Indian government has enthusiastically defended,
and in some cases reinvigorated, provisions against same-sex sexual activities."'
This is so despite the fact that the very colonial regimes that had enacted these laws
have long since abandoned them." 3
India's response can be characterized by simultaneous narratives of exclusion
through postcolonial reenactment: here, the Indian government embraces, indeed ef-
fectively legislates, the applicability of British colonial law in order to exclude sexual
equality from its own construction of citizenship. One form of colonization displaces
another, creating, in effect, a modem reenactment of colonial law in order to displace
and thus exclude countervailing arguments for equality and inclusion for India's sexual
minorities. The difference, however, in this modem context involves the perceived
origins of homosexuality: whereas the colonial period attributed its incidence in India
to "primitive" behaviors, the Indian government today attributes its growing visi-
bility to Western decadence and moral decline.' The result of these narratives of
exclusion, enactment, and denial, however, forecloses the possibility of growth, visi-
bility, and protection for sexual minorities in both public and private space."'
Although there are no laws which expressly criminalize homosexual status, section
377 criminalizes sodomy in India and remains in force today as a leftover statute from
the British era."6 The text of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows: "Of unnatural
"' See Sherry Joseph, Press Release, National Workshop to Advance Lesbian, Gay and
Bisexual Rights, Nov. 11, 1997 (on file with author). Aside from focusing on the pernicious
influence of section 377, the workshop also studied the ways in which family and obscenity
laws can be used to discriminate against gays and lesbians. See id; see also SEABROOK, supra
note 94, at 162.
12 See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, Naz Found. v. Gov't of NCT of Delhi (2001) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Government Brief].
13 See, e.g., SEABROOK, supra note 94, at 162.
"' For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property
and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 69 (2000).
"' For a thoughtful analysis of the power of sodomy laws in a non-western context, see
Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and Social
Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643 (2001).
116 See Gm THADANI, SAKHIYANI: LESBIAN DESIRE iN ANcIENT AND MODERN INDIA 79
1450 [Vol. 14:1429
SEXUALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
offences: Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with
any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or imprison-
ment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall be lia-
ble to fine.""' 7 The British Raj introduced this sodomy law to India in 1861,"8 and
in other colonies during the same period." 9 This provision was largely based upon tra-
ditional Judeo-Christian standards, which tended to proscribe all non-procreative sexual
activity that fell outside of traditional definitions of penile-vaginal intercourse. 120 Deep-
ly influenced by Victorian standards that tended to devalue pleasure or sexual activity
in general, these enactments were designed, in part, to rectify perceived "primitive"
aspects to Indian marital, familial, and sexual arrangements.' 2' The author of the
Act, Lord Macaulay, explained:
(1996).
117 Id.
"18 See Brief of Petitioner at 13, Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2001)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Naz Foundation Brief].
119 See Kris Franklin, The Rhetorics of Legal Authority Constructing Authoritativeness,
the "Ellen Effect, "and the Example of Sodomy Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 49, 63 (2001) ("Initially,
prohibitions against sodomy in the English colonies were borrowed from British law.");
Robin A. Warren, Gay Marriage: Analyzing Legal Strategies for Reform in Hong Kong and
the United States, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 771, 775 & n.21 (2004) (noting that Hong
Kong's anti-sodomy laws stemmed from its status as a British colony); see also Case, supra
note 4, at 123 & n.206 ("At the beginning of the nineteenth century in Britain, sodomy was
a capital offense for which a record number of more than fifty men were executed in the first
third of the century."); Goldstein, supra note 40, at 1082-85 nn.61-66, 74 (describing the incor-
poration of English sodomy laws into the new laws of the post-Revolutionary United States).
120 See Naz Foundation Brief, supra note 118, at 11; see also Recent Developments in
International Law, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 169, 175 (2000) (quoting Scott Long
describing how top Zambian government leaders, to send the message that homosexuality
was "'un-Zambian,"' were about to reinforce "the existing law on sodomy in Zambia, which
was itself a relic of the British colonial administration... to preserve Zambian national iden-
tity"); Elizabeth A. Leveno, Comment, New Hope for the New Federalism: State Constitutional
Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1029, 1043 & n. 118 (1994) (citing Justice
Berger's concurring opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick in which he wrote that "'[c]ondemnation
of [homosexual] practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards."'
(alteration in original)).
121 Naz Foundation Brief, supra note 118, at 13. One Indian citizen, commenting on section
377, explained that Indian sexuality is traditionally amorphous, and used the example of
Hindu deities, which often possess both female and male characteristics, and continued:
[o]nly when things come to be categorised, as in Article Three hundred
and seventy-seven of the Penal Code, which speaks of "acts against the
order of nature[,"] [sexuality] takes on a crude physicality, concentra-
ting on the sexual act rather than on the whole affective and emotional
complexity that goes with being male or female, or any combination of
them, along a continuum that knows nothing of such abrupt breaks.
SEABROOK, supra note 94, at 138. See also Shivanda Khan, Cultural Constructions of Male
Sexualities in India, NAz Ki PUKAAR (Naz Found. Int'l, London, U.K.), Jan. 1996 ("A form
of sexual neo-colonialism has arisen whereby our countries have been invaded by this
Western discourse and our own histories have been discounted.").
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[The act] relate[s] to an odious class of offences respecting which
it is desirable that as little as possible should be said.... We are
unwilling to insert, either in the text or the notes, any thing which
could give rise to public discussion on this revolting subject; as
we are decidedly of opinion that the injury which would be done
to the morals of the community by such discussion would far
more than compensate for any benefits which might be derived
from legislative measures framed with the greatest precision.
22
Instead, the Commission relied on Sir Edward Coke's influential definition of "'sodo-
my"' as "'committed by carnal knowledge against the ordinance of the Creator, and
other of nature, by mankind with mankind, or with brute beast, or by womankind with
brute beast.'"
23
Ironically, however, the United Kingdom reversed course in the mid-i 950s. After
a series of sensational public trials, including Oscar Wilde' s some fifty years prior,
public sentiment began to rise up against the law. 2 4 In 1954, British Parliament ap-
pointed a departmental committee, chaired by John Wolfenden, to examine "the law
and practice relating to homosexual offenses."'' 25 In the ensuing report published
three years later, the committee recommended that homosexual behavior between con-
senting adults in private should no longer be considered a criminal offense. 26 The
Report also found that "'homosexuality cannot legitimately be regarded as a disease,
because in many cases it is the only symptom and is compatible with full mental health
in other respects. '"1 27 In the end, the recommendations of the Report were taken under
consideration and subject to further research for ten additional years. 28 Finally, in
122 1 T.B.M. MACAULAY, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF LORD MACAULAY 144 (London,
Longmans Green & Co. 1898), quoted in Lynnette J. Chua Kher Shing, Saying No: Sections
377 and 377A of the Penal Code, 2003 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 215. See generally G.O.
TREVELYAN, THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF LORD MACAULAY (London, Longmans, Green, &
Co. 1923). See also Aditya Bondyopadhyay, Anti-Sodomy Laws, LAW. CoLLECriVE (May 2000),
available at http://www.lawyerscollective.org/lc-hivaids/publications/articles/may_2000.htm
(last visited Jan. 24,2006); Elizabeth Kolsky, Codification andthe Rule of Colonial Difference:
Criminal Procedure in British India, 23 LAW & HIST. REv. 631 (2005).
123 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CON-
CERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES, quoted
in Shing, supra note 122, at 215.
124 See, e.g., Wikipedia, Wolfenden Report ("The Report of the Departmental Committee
on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (better known as the Wolfenden report, after Lord
Wolfenden, the chairman of the committee) was published in Britain on September 3, 1957 af-
ter a succession of well-known men were convicted of homosexual offences."), at http://en.wiki
pedia.org/wiki/Wolfendenjreport (last visited Mar. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Wolfenden Report].
125 Larry Catd Backer, Tweaking Facts, Speaking Judgment: Judicial Transmogrification
of Case Narrative as Jurisprudence in the United States and Britain, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
611, 619 n.26 (1998).
126 See id.
127 See Bondyopadhyay, supra note 122; The Knitting Circle, Wolfenden, available at http://
myweb.lsbu.ac.uk/-stafflag/wolfenden.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
128 See Wolfenden Report, supra note 124 ("The law was only narrowly passed and it was
a decade after the report was published before the law was changed.").
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1967, Parliament passed the Sexual Offences Act, which decriminalized sexual acts
between two men in private.
129
Despite the fact that Britain saw fit to repeal its own sodomy provisions, India has
chosen to retain its enactments, and has now developed a host of interesting cases
addressing the commission of same-sex sexual acts. The similarity between Bowers
and the discussion surrounding section 377 is striking because both statutes, as stated,
criminalize sodomy, but are applied to, and equated with, criminalizing homosexual-
ity, rather than sodomy alone. 30 In one 1983 case, Fazal Rab vs. State of Bihar, the
Supreme Court of India observed that "the offence is one under Sec. 377, I[ndian]
P[enal] C[ode] which implies sexual perversity. No force appears to have been
used .... nor the fact that in some countries homosexuality has ceased to be an
offence, has influenced our thinking."' 3' At the same time, however, given that the
acts were consensual, "the Supreme Court reduced the sentence from 3 years... to
six months rigorous imprisonment.' 32 While the number of actual cases filed in
recent years is extremely low, 133 the force of the law lies in its coercive effect in
repressing same-sex sexual activity and gay or lesbian self-identification. 34 Here,
sodomy laws are used with alarming regularity to harass, threaten, and silence gay
organizing. 35 In many countries, the involvement of the police has led to a corrupt
and often dangerous collusion.'36
129 See Sexual Offenses Act, 1967, c. 60, § 1 (1) (Eng.), amended by Criminal Justice and Pub-
lic Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 145(1) (Eng.).
130 In the past, section 377 has applied to males who engage in sexual relations with one
another, particularly the "insertive" partner. Sherry Joseph, The Law and Homosexuality in
India, Int'l Conf. on Preventing Violence, Caring for Survivors: Role of Health Prof'ls &
Servs. in Violence (Nov. 28-30, 1998), available at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/Organizations/
healthnet/ SAsia/suchana/0909/rh374.htnil (last visited Jan. 24,2006) ("[D]ejure, it is an attempt
to criminalise sodomy while de facto it is an attempt to criminalise and stigmatise homosex-
uality."). Further, the Divorce Act permits a wife to apply for divorce if her husband is guilty
of sodomy or bestiality. See id. The law has also been used to criminalize lesbian rela-
tionships. See id.; see also INDIA TODAY, Apr. 18, 1990, cited in Background Paper, infra note
133, at 4.
131 Joseph, supra note 130.
132 Id.
133 See id. (noting 30 total cases between 1860 and 1992, the majority of which dealt with
non-consensual intercourse and assaults on minors); see also Background Paper, Strategies
to Advance Lesbian and Gay Rights, available at http://altindia.net/altsex/background-paper.htm.
134 THADANI, supra note 116, at 80.
13' HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INDIA, EPIDEMIC OF ABUSE: POLICE HARASSMENT OF HIV/AIDS
OUTREACH WORKERS IN INDIA 3 (July 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/
india2/india0602.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2006) ("Police have beaten peer educators, claimed
without basis that HIV/AIDS outreach work promotes prostitution, and brought trumped-up
criminal charges against HV/AIDS workers. Police also extort money and sex from these wor-
kers."); PUCL-KARNATAKA, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST SEXUALITY MINORITIES
IN INDIA (Feb. 2001), available at http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Gender/2003/sexual-minorities.
pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2006); Marion Lloyd, Out ofindia's Antigay Closet, Producer Tries to
Ease Strictures, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1999, at A12; MV Ramana, Same-Sex South Asia, HI-
MAL S. ASIAN MAG., July 2003, available at http://www.himalmag.com/2003/July/commentary-
sa_2.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
136 SEABROOK, supra note 94, at 104-05. The fact that the offense is cognizable (meaning
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The past few years have seen an increased drive to overturn the legacy of section
377, particularly in the wake of fears of the global AIDS pandemic. As one of the
leaders of the Indian gay civil rights movement, Aditya Bondyopadhyay, has argued:
In India two parallel trends exist as far as men who have sex with
men .... The first is a pseudo-acceptance of same-sex relation-
ships, arising out of non-acknowledgement of the very existence
of homosexuality .... This attitude [of ostrich-like blindness]
has its benefits in as much as homosexuals are left alone to their
own devices and are not untowardly bothered. But it also means
that the system and the state does not take any step whatsoever
by way of welfare measures for homosexuals, or for the protection
of their basic human and fundamental rights.'37
He continues:
The second trend is an outright homophobic reaction by certain
segments [of] society. In misplaced appreciation of what "Indian"
culture is all about, the state and many so called cultural organisa-
tions categorise homosexuality as a western/foreign import[,] ...
a corrupting influence that needs to be curbed.'38
Each of these themes shares an intimate relationship with the social norms that
surround, and, therefore, entrench conceptions of sexual identity.1 39 Each of these
that the police may arrest without a warrant), and non-bailable exacerbates the situation. See
Anuja Gupta, Testimony at the International Tribunal on Human Rights Violations Against
Sexual Minorities (Oct. 17, 1995), http://www.iglhrc.org/ files/iglhrc/reports/Tribunal.pdf
(relaying knowledge of incidents of harassment and bribery against Indian men). The same
happened in a park in Lucknow, India, where a police spokesman explained that .' [p]olice will
not allow male couples into the park if they know they are gays."' Rex Wockner, Indian Gays
Bannedfrom Park, PINKINK, Jan. 1999, available at http://www.khsnet.net/pinkink/990l/news2.
htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). He elaborated: "'Policemen will ask them if they are gay. If they
hold hands or are demonstrative about their affection, we'll suspect them of being gay."' Id.
137 See Aditya Bondyopadhyay, Anti-Sodomy Laws: An Overview, NAz Ki PUKAAR (Naz
Found. Int'l, London, U.K.), July 2001, at 4.
138 id.
139 For example, consider this narrative:
I began to dislike myself for being a homosexual and felt ashamed that
I had to hide my sexuality all the time. Many questions haunted me.
Why did I become a homosexual? Am I not man enough? What if some-
body discovers I am gay? Would I be able to live the rest of my life with
shame? I could own my sexuality under the cover of darkness, in a world
peopled by anonymous individuals; everywhere else I had to suppress
it. Leading a double life was tearing me apart.
Person quoted in Arvind Narrain, The Articulation of Rights Around Sexuality and Health:
Subaltern Queer Cultures in the Era ofHindutva, 7 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 3, 8 (2004) [herein-
after Narrain, Articulation of Rights]. Elsewhere, Narrain has written other excellent studies
of the relationship between sodomy and status in India. See, e.g., Arvind Narrain, Human
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perspectives demonstrate how the presence of sodomy laws erases the ability to form
communities based on group rights and identities due to the risk of public sanction.
In 1994, a medical team visiting a men' s jail observed a high incidence of sexual
activity among inmates, and recommended making provisions for condom distribu-
tion. 40 The jail officials, however, refused on the grounds that condom distribution
would encourage male sexual behavior, thereby leading to violations of section 377. '
In response, a human rights group filed a petition challenging the constitutional va-
lidity of section 377, and requested that the officials enjoinjail authorities from seques-
tering those prisoners who were HIV positive or otherwise identified with same-sex
sexual activity."'
The petition unfortunately languished until 2001, when the issue was revisited
again. That July, the police, investigating a complaint of sodomy, raided a public
park in Lucknow, India, that was known to be frequented by men who have sex with
men and various other sexual minorities.'43 One of the individuals arrested during
the raid was a member of a health education and activist group; later, the police rai-
ded the offices of Bharosa and Naz Foundation International (both organizations that
work in the MSM community), arrested four individuals, and registered a complaint
under section 377, along with other charges regarding the sale of obscene material,
conspiracy to commit an offense, and abetment of a crime.'" Almost instantly, the
Rights and Sexual Minorities: Global and Local Contexts, LGD (2001), at http://www2.
warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc.law.elh.lgd/2001-2/narrain (last visited Jan. 30, 2006); Arvind Narrain,
Queer People and the Law, SEMINAR, Apr. 2003 [hereinafter Narrain, Queer People and the
Law], http://www.india-seminar.con/2003/524/524%20arvind% 20narrain.htm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2006); Arvind Narrain, There Are No Short Cuts to Queer Utopia: Sodomy, Law, and
Social Change, LINES, Feb. 2004, http://www.lines-magazine.org/ArtFebO4/Arvind.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Narrain, Queer Utopia].
140 See Mustikhan, supra note 11 (noting that in 1994 a petition similar to one asking prison
officials to distribute condoms was filed).
" Id. ("The officer in charge of a prison in Delhi once prevented condom distribution on
the grounds that it tacitly condoned sodomy.").
142 Interestingly, the petition only sought to amend, not repeal, section 377, which would
still be used to cover male-on-male rape. See id.
' See Saleem Kidwai, Aliens in Lucknow, NEWINTERNATIONALIST, June 2002, available
at http://www.newint.org/issue346/aliens.htm ("[P]olice raided a dingy park near the railway
station where cruising homosexuals and male sex-workers mingle with the homeless street
people and bleary-eyed commuters. They arrested five people including two alleged pimps
and an 'outreach worker' from a local non-governmental group (NGO).").
" Narrain, Articulation of Rights, supra note 139, at 13; see also India Accused of Rights
Abuses, Rainbow Network, Apr. 10, 2002, http://www.rainbownetwork.con/News/detail.
asp?iData= 15456&iCat=29&iChannel=2&nChannel=News (describing how one Indian lawyer
asked the United Nations Human Rights Commission to hold India responsible for its harass-
ment, arrest, and torture of the Lucknow Four, HIV prevention workers who spent anywhere
from forty-five days to seven months in jail without bail); Int'l Gay & Lesbian Human Rights
Comm'n, Indian High Court Dismisses Sodomy Law Challenge, Sept. 3, 2004, http://www.
iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/section.php?id= 5&detail=518 (last visited Jan. 30, 2006) (noting that
seven people had been arrested in public "cruising" areas and that the Lucknow Four had
been released on bail); Int'l Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Comm'n, Sodomy, Obscenity Char-
ges Formally Filed in Trial of "Lucknow Four", Dec. 18, 2001, http://www.iglhrc.org/site/
iglhrc/section.php?id=5&detail=95 (last visited Jan. 30,2006) (summarizing the incident and
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incident registered a national public debate regarding health, homosexuality, and the
applicability of section 377 to the modem birth of the Indian gay and lesbian move-
ment. 45 Countless editorials and articles were written, many of which decried the
modem applicability of such an outdated law to individuals who were merely attemp-
ting to educate a disenfranchised community regarding public health and safety.'46
The parallels between the effect of section 377 and the immediate aftermath of
Bowers is striking. Like the courts in the wake of Bowers, section 377 was interpreted
to suggest that a gay or lesbian sexual orientation was immediately considered to be
tainted with the imprint of criminality.1 47 Likewise, any public health education was
considered to be an abetment to a criminal offense (sodomy), rather than a brazen
act of human dignity and protection. 4 ' Consider the statement of the Public Prosecu-
tor, quoted with approval by the judge who denied bail for the Lucknow Four on the
grounds that "they ... are polluting the entire society by encouraging the young
persons and abetting them for committing the offense of sodomy."'4 9 Like the wake
of Bowers, the act of sodomy - indeed, any and all sexual activity between members
of the same sex, or even a discussion of the issue - became a criminal act. 50 As a re-
sult, any public education surrounding either the sexuality or the identity of the individu-
als became an abetment to the offense, a resounding puncture of moral order and hetero-
sexual norms that was remedied by reference to criminal law for its deterrent potential.
Indeed, in such circumstances, the linkage between criminality and sodomy is so
pervasive that public health education became a revolutionary act of civil disobedience.
As Arvind Narrain eloquently points out, in the case of the Lucknow Four, neither
providing sample letters of protest); State-Supported Oppression and Persecution of Sexual
Minorities in India, NGO Briefing, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights (Apr. 8, 2002) (state-
ment of Mr. Aditya Bondyopadhyay, lawyer for the Lucknow Four)), available at http://www.
iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/section.php?id=5&detail=67 (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
145 India, of course, had just recently faced another national public debate in the wake of
the film "Fire," which depicted an emotional and sexual relationship between two sisters-in-
law. See Sunder, supra note 114. Many excellent articles have been written analyzing the
import of "Fire" on India's lesbian and gay movement. See, e.g., Gayatri Gopinath, On Fire,
4 GLQ J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 631, 632-33 (1998); Ratna Kapur, Postcolonial Erotic
Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex, and Nation in India, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 333, 374 (2001); Sunder, supra note 114, at 81 (describing how critics of the film felt that
the filmmakers were "attempting to influence India with ideas about sexuality imported from
a decadent West").
146 Amara Dasa, India's Slow Descent Into Homophobia, VAISHNAVA NEws, July 12,2003,
available at http://www.vnn. org/editorials/ET0307/ET12-8214.html (calling Penal Code sec-
tion 377 outdated and placing much of the blame on British colonial rule by observing that "[t]he
influence that Victorian British scholars and educators had in creating the current homophobic
environment of India cannot be underestimated."); Sharma, supra note 14 (pointing out the irony
that "while the British drafted Section 377 of the IPC, while replacing a tolerant Indian atti-
tude towards sexuality with a highly oppressive one, this law was repealed in the UK in 1967.").
147 See Katyal, supra note 16, at 163.
148 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
14' Narrain, Articulation of Rights, supra note 139, at 13 (quoting Criminal Misc. Case No.
2054/2001).
"0 At least in those states which maintained their sodomy laws.
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the state nor the media chose to explore the issue in light of the global HIV/AIDS
epidemic, choosing instead to sensationalize - and therefore stigmatize - the work
of the Naz Foundation and Bharosa by linking it to homosexuality, rather than access
to public health education.''
During the pendency of this case, the Naz Foundation decided to revive the issue
of constitutionality, and petitioned the Delhi High Court to "read down" or limit the
applicability of section 377. 152 Interestingly, the Naz Foundation did not seek to repeal
the entire section, but only to officially remove criminal penalties for consensual sexual
activities between adults if done in private. 53 In effect, their proposal maintained that
section 377 would remain a viable charge for those who engaged in the sexual abuse
of children, as well as those individuals who engaged in public sexual behavior.'54 In
making this argument, the Foundation argued that section 377 made HIV-prevention
work "impossible" due to its overreaching stigma, which made it difficult to identify
vulnerable populations. The resulting threat of criminal sanction forced networks
among men who have sex with men underground into secrecy, making opportunities
for private, consensual safe sex both spatially and socially difficult. 155
Two particular themes are particularly relevant because they highlight some key
divergences between the United States and India regarding both history and litigation
strategy. The first notable aspect of this situation involves the comparative invisi-
bility of expressive gay or lesbian identity-based rhetoric in the brief. The term "men
who have sex with men," rather than "gay men," figures most prominently, gener-
ating a set of cultural and public health concerns that avoid, indeed actively trans-
cend, the need for sexual identity and categorization.'56 Rather than focusing on the
challenges faced by gay men and lesbians in India, the brief focuses on the particular
public health challenges that are raised as a result of the sodomy laws - irrespective
of the division made between heterosexual and homosexual identity.'57 Here, the
brief emphasizes the stigma of criminality that attaches to all non-procreative sex,
pointing out that while certain groups face the stigma more strongly than others,
section 377 extends its prohibitive taint beyond same-sex conduct alone. 5
'' Narrain, Articulation of Rights, supra note 139, at 13.
..2 See Siddharth Narrain, A Battlefor Sexual Rights, FRONTLINE (India), May 7-20, 2005,
available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2210/stories/20050520002410400.htm (last
visited Apr. 9, 2006).
'5 See id.
's4 See id. The reason for this strategy, Narrain explains, is the absence of any alternative
protections against child sexual abuse. See id. In India, rape laws are limited by gender (applies
to women only) and only to penile-vaginal intercourse. See id. Thus, without section 377, there
would be no statutes to protect children (male and female) from sexually abusive acts that fall
outside of Indian rape law's strict categories. See id.
... See Naz Foundation Brief, supra note 118, at 22.
156 For an excellent, critical description of the term, its implications, and the risks and bene-
fits associated with its employment in several public health studies, see Dasgupta & Purkayastha,
supra note 86, at 10.
117 See Naz Foundation Brief, supra note 118, at 22-25.
158 Id. at 13.
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Second, within its brief, the Naz Foundation emphasized the role of history, citing
the findings of two scholars that found "a set of generally tolerant traditions in pre-
colonial India"'59 regarding homosexuality that markedly shifted in the late nineteenth
century after the advent of colonization.'60 It also cited to evidence of homosexual-
ity throughout various centuries and cultures, pointing to a number of prominent his-
torical figures who are said to have engaged in homosexual conduct, and "[a]nthropo-
logical research [that] has found homosexual subcultures in Native American cultures,
ancient Greece, Chinese traditions, Subsaharan Africa, and the Samurai traditions in
Japan."'16' According to Narrain, one of the crafters of this brief:
It is the above [references to same-sex sexuality throughout Indian
history] which provides the strongest rebuttal to the notion of
queer rights being a western disease - a careful drawing of a
narrative that traces the queer as part of 'out' history and em-
bodying a set of practices which exist at times unacknowledged,
at others hidden, at yet others struggling to become 'visible.' In
more simple terms, queer rights is an issue for Indians because
there are queer traditions, queer practices, and queer people in India
and rights language is one mode of making this history visible. 1
62
Despite the Naz Foundation's attempts at crafting a strategy that would protect
only private, consensual behavior, and a historical version that affirmed tolerance
for same-sex sexual conduct amidst a timeless Indian tradition, the Indian govern-
ment's response offered a stinging tribute to the Act's colonial origins. Indeed, just
after Lawrence was handed down, the Indian government filed a vociferous brief:
"If an act has a tendency to create breach of peace or to offend public morals it is not
in the power of any man to give effectual consent,"'163 the government explained.
"And while the right to respect for private and family life is undisputed, interference
by public authority in the interest of public safety and protection of health and morals
is equally permissible," the Government warned, predicting that decriminalization
"can well open the floodgates of delinquent behavior and be misconstrued as provi-
ding unbridled license for the same."' 64 By reconstructing section 377 as a function
of the modem state's police powers, the government attempted to construe homo-
sexuality as an offense against public order and morals, and deserving of criminal regu-
lation.
Perhaps most notably, the Government mounted a defense of section 377 that
turned quite intimately on regulating existing social norms in India. The Government
argued that
is9 Id. (citing SAME SEX LOVE IN INDIA 194 (Ruth Vanita & Saleem Kidwai eds., 2000)).
"6 See id. at 13.
161 Id. at 19.
162 Narrain, Queer People and the Law, supra note 139.
163 Government Brief, supra note 112, at 4.
164 Id.
1458 [Vol. 14:1429
SEXUALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
[lI]aw does not run separately from the society. It only reflects
the perception of the society. When Section 377 was brought un-
der the statute as an act of criminality, it responded to the values
and mores of the time in the Indian society. In any parliamentary
secular democracy, the legal conception of crime depends on po-
litical as well as moral considerations notwithstanding consider-
able overlap existing between legal and everyday conception of
crime (i.e. moral factors). There is no necessary equation between
the two. Public tolerance of different activities changes and legal
categories get influenced by those changes. The social dynamics
take into account the moral aspect also. 65
Later in the brief, the Government cited to a report by the Law Commission of India,
which "observed that Indian society by and large disapproves of homosexual and
[that] disapproval was strong enough to justify it being treated as a criminal offense
even where the adults indulge in it in private."' 6 With respect to the West, the Gov-
ernment replied that "[t]he public, notably in the United Kingdom and the United States
of America, have shown tolerance of a new sexual behavior or sexual preference but
it is not the universally accepted behavior," pointing out again to the Law Commis-
sion's report that concluded that comparable tolerance does not exist in India, nor
did it exist in Indian society prior to colonial rule. 1
67
Consider the theme of history and citizenship in this regard. Rather than embra-
cing Indian history, which is replete with its own, well-documented representations
of same-sex sexuality through texts, 161 the government chose instead to mount a vo-
ciferous campaign against the existence of "modem" homosexuality within its bor-
ders. 69 Here, no mention was made of the vast and complex representations, both
visual and verbal, of same-sex sexual behavior throughout Indian history - stories
and pictorials that predated English colonization. 170 Rather, the Government instead
chose to taint same-sex sexual activity with the same Bowers-like ability to divide
society along the boundaries of identity, instead of universalized conceptions of beha-
vior and desire. Under this view, homosexuality may exist in India, but it deserved
relegation to the interior aspects of the home, rather than the public or the street -
and certainly nowhere deserved recognition as a legitimate lifestyle or choice of part-
nership. Along these lines, the Government' s brief turned its attention to underenforce-
ment, assuring the Court that section 377 has "only been applied on the complaint
165 Id. at 7.
'6 Id. In another report, however, a government commission did recommend deletion of
section 377. LAWCOMM'NOFINDIA, 172DREPORTONREVIEWOFRAPELAwS (2000), available
at http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/rapelaws.htm.
167 Id. at 7-9.
161 See generally SAME-SEX LOVE IN INDIA: READINGS FROM LrrERATuRE AND HISTORY
(Ruth Vanita & Saleem Kidwai eds., 2000).
169 See Government Brief, supra note 112.
170 See Dasa, supra note 146 (providing a timeline of Indian history with various examples
of tolerance toward non-heterosexual behavior).
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of a victim and there are no instances of its being used arbitrarily,"'' and pointing
out that it has only been applied to "cases of assault where bodily harm is intended
and/or caused.' ' 172 Section 377, the Government argued, is only intended to apply
to situations that are not covered by other sections of the Penal Code, 173 and argued
that the provision fell within the powers of the state "to make special provisions for
women and children.' 74 Contrary to the brief filed by the Naz Foundation, the Gov-
ernment argued that section 377 is primarily used to punish child abuse and to comp-
lement existing rape laws, and "not mere homosexuality.' 75
In a final, confusing paragraph in its brief, the Government noted that "there is
no violation of fundamental liberty as long as any act of homosexuality/lesbianism
is practiced between two consenting adults in the privacy [of the home] as in the
case of heterosexuality.' ' 176 Consider, for a moment, the complexity of the Govern-
ment's observations. Here, the Government actively renders invisible the myriad
ways in which the police, extra-legally, enforce social norms favoring the privatization
of same-sex sexuality through extortion, corruption, rape, and threatened the arrest
of males who engage in public, same-sex affection. The Government's reaction sug-
gests that such informal regulations of public sex are better left untouched. By failing
to recognize the existence of informal, corrupt regulations of sexuality, and by creating
some "private" spaces for same-sex sexuality to exist, the Government's observations
preclude the possibility of a public group identity among those engaged in same-sex
sexual activity, relegating it to a private, sexual behavior that should only occur in
seclusion. In both respects, the possibility of group rights becomes extinguished in
favor of the malleable, variable, and often invisible aspects of same-sex sexual beha-
vior within the circumscribed spaces of the sovereign home.
11. TOWARD A GLOBAL THEORY OF SEXUAL SOVEREIGNTY
The Indian government's reaction to section 377 is characterized by an implicit
reification of the privatization of sexuality. Its observations both reinforce and impose
the internal dynamics of the closet discussed in the previous section; and, in doing
so, the government reenacts a modem version of colonial rule and control. On one
hand, it argues that social norms opposing homosexuality are deeply entrenched
throughout Indian society, in stark contrast to the "tolerance" shown in the United
States and the United Kingdom of this "new sexual behavior" or "preference." At
the same time, however, the Government is careful to circumscribe the boundaries
between public and private in a way that reifies the presumption that sexuality -
whether of the same or opposite sex - should always be rightly confined to the home.
One of the brief s central themes dismisses any visibility for lesbian and gay sexu-
"' Government Brief, supra note 112, at 4.
172 Id. at 4-5.
173 See id.
174 Id. at 5.
171 Id. at 6.
176 Id. at 12.
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ality as part of the identities, activities, or loyalties of the Indian people. Here, despite
the rich verbal and pictorial history of same-sex sexuality, the Government refuses
to name it as part of a gay or lesbian history, thereby precluding the possibility for
identification across time, history, and space.
As this section will discuss, there is, however, an answer to the divergence be-
tween public and private space and identity: Lawrence's underlying theme of sexual
self-determination, or sexual sovereignty. As this section argues, Lawrence's tripartite
structure allows for some development and capability surrounding sexuality and
identity that traverses both public and private boundaries in favor of offering a
vision of sexual autonomy that, while it initially overshadows these divisions, is still,
ultimately, circumscribed by them.
Sovereignty, as it is defined in international law, comprises both internal and
external facets; a sovereign government "faces both outward at other states and inward
at its population."' 77 The principle of internal sovereignty in international law entails
the exercise of authority within certain, circumscribed boundaries, permitting govern-
ments to provide political goods for citizens.'78 It draws substantially upon principles
of self-determination, which involves the right of peoples to "freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."'
79
In contrast, sovereignty's outward aspects - external sovereignty - focuses on an
equality of status between the states and requires "freedom from outside interfer-
ence." 80 Both of these strands carry important Hobbesian and Lockean dimensions;
the Hobbesian strand "emphasize[s] the inviolability of national borders"'' and
absolute control within the nation-state, whereas the Lockean construction premises
its meaning on the social contract that exists between a government and its citizens
that places property, life, and liberty as fundamental values. 82
The notion of state sovereignty quite beautifully parallels the notion of a sovereign
self. Louis Henkin, for example, has listed several aspects of sovereignty - indepen-
dence, personhood, autonomy, and impermeability, among others - that correspond
nicely to both the person as well as the nation-state. 8 3 As I will show, these principles
177 See ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONALRELATIONS,
ANDTHETHIRD WORLD 27-29 (1990); see also MICHAELROSs FOWLER &JUIEMARIEBUNCK,
LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT
OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (1995); F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 107, 122-32 (2d ed. 1986); STEPHEN
D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 43-72 (1999).
178 JACKSON, supra note 177, at 29.
"' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
180 JACKSON, supra note 177, at 27. See also Catherine J. Ions, Indigenous Peoples andSelf
Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. 199, 236 (1992).
181 Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2033 (2003).
182 For further explication, see id. at 2033-34.
183 See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLmCs AND VALUES 9-10 (Devs. in Int'l
L. Series No. 18,1995), cited in Celia R. Taylor, A Modest Proposal: Statehood and Sovereignty
in a GlobalAge, 18 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 745, 756-57 (1997). Some of these attributes
involve "claim" elements, which correspond to statehood; and some of these elements involve
"exercise" elements, which correspond to a set of rights, responsibilities, and obligations that
attach to a sovereign entity. Id. at 756.
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also carry substantial resonance when we compare them to Lawrence. This section
seeks to sketch out some elements - mutually reinforcing, overlapping, and
ultimately cohesive - that also bear witness to the growing development of a
jurisprudence that establishes both internal and external sovereignties with respect
to sexuality, the community, and the self.'4 Here, I argue that Henkin's vision of
sovereign statehood parallels the notion of sovereign personhood that is offered in
Lawrence. Henkin' s notion of independence, for example, embraces the principle
of separateness and political and physical distinctiveness. 85 This principle roughly
corresponds to Lawrence's embrace of spatial privacy, a principle that applies the
idea of sovereignty to the private domain of the home. Henkin's exposition of
personhood, too, also corresponds to both personal and national sovereignty: it in-
volves the notion of recognition of the nation-state entity as a national actor.I"6 Auto-
nomy, too, has dual meanings: in the state context, it means the ability to act indepen-
dently of external influence and control, but in the Lawrence context, it corresponds
to the deliberative right of sexual self-determination. 87
Together, I argue that Lawrence comprises the starting points for a global theory
of sexual sovereignty that is bordered, deliberative, and ultimately expressive in cha-
racter, and offers a trilogy of protections for spatial privacy, expressive liberty, and
deliberative autonomy. Yet, as Part HI will continue, this theory is not without its
faults and ultimately offers us a critical challenge in contemplating a more inclusive
future for global gay rights and autonomy.188 One critical element remains missing
from the parallel prisms I have offered: the notion of sovereign equality, which in-
volves the principle that each state exists on an equal plane to all others. 189 This ab-
sence, like its global counterpart in international relations, signals a host of limitations
for Lawrence's progeny, and a danger of globalized containment of the rights of sex-
ual minorities.
'8 Many scholars have also explored Lawrence's reliance on case law from other juris-
dictions that have overturned sodomy laws. See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 4; John K. Setear,
A Forest With No Trees: The Supreme Court and International Law in the 2003 Term, 91
VA. L. REv. 579 (2005); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Trans-
national Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487,
487 (2005).
185 See HENKIN, supra note 183, at 10.
186 Taylor, supra note 183, at 760-61 (describing Henkin's views on "personhood").
187 Id. at 762.
188 Others have offered cogent critiques of Lawrence as compared to other cases involving
the repeal of sodomy laws. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 4, at 1404 (citing the 1998 South African
case of National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SAG
(66), which found that the 1957 Sexual Offenses Act, a national anti-sodomy law, violated
the South African Constitution on three theories: equality, dignity, and privacy, and arguing
that this case demonstrates that the U.S. Supreme Court could have chosen to invalidate the
Texas sodomy law with a "genus of rights" rather than solely on the basis of privatized liberty);
Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 4.
189 See HENKIN, supra note 183, at 10.
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A. Spatial Privacy
In 1998, a Texas-area neighbor called the police with a report of a suspicious
black man in John Geddes Lawrence's apartment."g After pushing their way into
the dwelling, they found Lawrence having sex with another man, Tyson Garner) 9
At the time, Texas rarely enforced its antisodomy law, but officers decided to jail
them overnight on charges of "deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of
the same sex."'1 92 They were each arrested, fined two hundred dollars plus court costs,
and kept in jail overnight.'93
Unlike most defendants, who might opt to simply pay the fine and move for-
ward, the defendants chose to mount an appeal on constitutional grounds. In affirming
their convictions under both the state and federal constitutions, the state court of ap-
peals held that the statute was not unconstitutional and considered Bowers v. Hardwick
to be controlling on that point.' 94 The United States Supreme Court, however, ulti-
mately granted certiorari on the question of whether the criminal convictions under
the Texas statute, which criminalized sexual acts between members of the same sex,
but not different sexes, violated the Equal Protection Clause, in addition to the in-
terests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process clause.' 95
Like Bowers, the most palpable aspect of the case involved the reach of the
prosecutory powers of the law into the previously sacred sphere of the home. For
this reason, at the outset of Lawrence, the Court began from a notion of spatial pri-
vacy, reminding the audience at every turn that the law in question governs activities
in "the most private of places, the home."' 96 In doing so, the Lawrence court focused
a scrutinizing gaze on the heightened degree of state intrusion into the home. 197 By
using its observatory powers, the Court discursively defined the home as an area of
sovereignty, free from interference by the state that treads upon the right to territorial
integrity. 198 The opinion, for example, began with the unapologetic observation that
"[1]iberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling
or other private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home."' 99
"9 See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1021; see also Respondent's Brief, Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), available at 2003 WL 470184.
9' Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1021.
192 TEXAs PENALCODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003). See also Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1021.
Anne Gearan, CourtAppears Divided onAnti-Sodomy Case, AssOCIATED PRESS, Mar.
26, 2003.
1" Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349,360-61,364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001), rev'd, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
'91 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
,96 Id. at 567.
197 id.
98 See Paul R. Williams & Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty: An Emerging Conflict
Resolution Approach, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 437, 443 (2004).
'99 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
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This observation, obviously, resonates with the long-standing constitutional tra-
dition of protecting the home from state intrusion. Even from the beginning of Ameri-
can history, the home has been traditionally thought to be a sanctuary that falls outside
of the aegis of state control. In Griswold v. Connecticut,200 the Court invalidated a
law prohibiting the use of contraceptives or aiding and abetting the use of contracep-
tives by a married couple.20 ' The Griswold majority found that a fundamental right
of privacy, defined as the right to be free from governmental intrusion, existed under
the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights.20 2 In delineating the scope of this right, the
Griswold court relied upon an early case, Boyd v. United States, that declared the
importance of protection against "all invasions on the part of the government... of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. 203
Griswold, of course, took these observations a step further, applying notions of
privacy to the context of "the marriage relation and the protected space of the mari-
tal bedroom. ' '204 The "marital bedroom" thusly served as the locus for the origins
of the right to privacy in American jurisprudence, particularly where the expression
of sexuality is concerned. Previously, in Bowers, the Court declined to immunize
the conduct based on the fact that it took place within the confines of Hardwick's
home.21 In reaching this earlier conclusion, the Court admitted that homosexual con-
duct between consenting adults was essentially a "victimless crime," but concluded
that "it would be difficult... to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while
leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though
they are committed in the home."2°"
It is thus significant that the Lawrence court, in its opening paragraph, began its
inquiry by focusing on the importance of spatial privacy.20 7 In doing so, the Court
offered a vision of privacy that is carefully tethered to the existence of private property
and the home. The Court's opening observations on the subject of privacy, obviously,
resonate with the long-standing constitutional tradition of protecting the home from
state intervention. Later, Lawrence also relied on Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which the
Court extended this right beyond the marital relationship, and invalidated a law pro-
hibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.20 ' Here, the Court
neatly separated the privacy interests from the marital relationship, observing that
"'[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.' 209 Applying these
principles to Lawrence, by extension, sexual activity is (somewhat tautologically)
considered "private," seemingly by virtue of its secluded location and not because
200 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 484.
203 Id. at 484 n.* (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
204 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
205 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986).
206 Id.
207 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
208 Id. at 565 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
209 Id. (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453) (emphasis in original).
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of the marital-like qualities of the relationship between the two parties, Garner and
Lawrence.2 '0 Towards the end of the opinion, the Lawrence Court argued:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage
in their [sexual] conduct without intervention of the government.
"It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter." The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion
into the personal and private life of the individual.1
This unstated emphasis on the individual's choice of sexual intimacies in private
space, rather than on the couple, marks a crucial, deeply liberatory vision of human
sexuality - as long as it occurs within the home. The Court's extension of the
protective sphere of spatial privacy in Griswold to address a wholly separate context
- that of two unmarried, gay men during a sexual encounter - is indeed striking,
and notable, because it extends the protective sphere of spatial privacy beyond that
of a married couple, and instead uses it to protect individuals who were, under Bowers,
previously thought undeserving of wholly private spaces due to their gay or lesbian
identities. "The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that pur-
port to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act," Justice Kennedy wrote. 2' 2
"Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching
upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of
places, the home. 21 3 Indeed, the Lawrence Court carefully pointed out that "[1]aws
prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting
in private," but instead focused primarily on predatory acts against those who were un-
able to or did not consent to such activity, or acts which took place in public space.214
In making this observation, the Lawrence Court set forth a view of the privacy of
the home that strikingly mirrors many of the observations often made by scholars on
the function of sovereignty itself in the global arena. Theoretically, this principle esta-
blishes a notion of autonomy within the home that is striking in its global, idealistic
possibility. The right offered by Lawrence is both positive and negative: it focuses on
cordoning off spheres of the home from state interference, and it also focuses on the
possibility - read most broadly - of a fundamental right to engage in sexual intimacy.
210 Indeed, the Court suggests that one possible reason for why there is little historical
discussion of the policy behind punishing consenting adults for same-sex sexual acts within
the law is due to the "very private nature of the conduct" at issue. Id. at 570.
211 Id. at 578 (internal citation omitted).
212 Id. at 567.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 569.
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Consider, for example, the global significance of recognizing the sanctity of the home
in constructing a boundary between private and public space, so that an individual may
safely retreat from others' gaze and scrutiny.215 The private sphere, according to Edward
Shils, involves a sphere where a person "is not bound by the rules that govern public
life .... The 'private life' is a secluded life, a life separated from the compelling
burdens of public authority. '216 Similarly, Hannah Arendt points out:
[T]he four walls of one's private property offer the only reliable
hiding place from the common public world, not only from every-
thing that goes on in it but also from its very publicity, from
being seen and being heard. A life spent entirely in public, in the
presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow. While
it retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from
some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose
its depth in a very real, non-subjective sense.217
On one level, Arendt' s metaphors of visibility and depth help us to understand the
functions of spatial privacy in constructing a self-actualized existence. Private pro-
perty constructs and underpins notions of autonomy by ensuring a degree of solitude
that is necessary for true human self-actualization. None of this is particularly new
or shocking, except when we consider that none of these protections extended to in-
dividuals engaged in same-sex sexual activity before now.
This principle is perhaps most valuable when we consider how it specially im-
pacts individuals whose sexualities escape the polarizing categories I listed earlier.
Here, I would argue that Lawrence, taken to its widest extent, is inescapably anti-
essentialist in character because it tends to focus less on the expressive identity that
characterizes most case law on gay rights. Anti-essentialist thought argues "that
identity cannot be reduced to an essence that is so central to an individual's being
that it precludes other categories of analysis along the axes of race/ethnicity, gender,
class, religion, and sexual orientation. 218 Along these lines, instead of predicating
215 See Seidman, supra note 4, at 1330 ("[C]onstitutional law remains all about boundaries.
The great constitutional struggles of our history have concerned the boundaries between le-
gislative and executive power, between the public and the private, or between the national and
the local.").
216 See Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constructions and Vicissitudes, 31 L. &CONTEMP. PROBS.
281, 283 (1966).
217 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITON 71 (1958).
218 Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical andPragmatic Explora-
tion of Women's International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71, 108-09 (2003).
For an excellent exploration of anti-essentialism's potential impact on feminism, see Tracy E.
Higgins,Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 102-03
(1996) (describing feminist anti-essentialism as an approach that rethinks the assumption that
gender oppression can be described meaningfully along a single globalized axis and instead fo-
cuses "on local, contextualized problems of gender oppression.... Like cultural relativism,
feminist anti-essentialism seems to lead to the conclusion that gender inequality cannot be ex-
plained cross-culturally.").
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legal protection on an asserted or public identity, the Court opts instead to predicate its
protection on the expressive significance of a level of sexual intimacy between persons.
Perhaps the function of Lawrence lies in presenting a view of same-sex sexuality
that surpasses legal ossification, one that refuses to deny the sexualization of identity,
but one that also protects a scenario of intimacy between persons that does not always
require the public assertion of gay or lesbian identity in public space - or even le-
gal recognition through marriage - in order for it to be valuable or constitutionally
protected. This cultural breathing space is significant because it implicitly advances
an anti-essentialist platform; the home, and the persons within it, neither attain nor re-
quire any special identity or expression, but the space is simply provided, and seclu-
ded, for the benefit of the persons within it and for the exercise of human autonomy,
intimacy, and deliberation. Recall that Lawrence extended its protection to homosexu-
als, lesbians, or bisexuals "either by 'orientation, conduct, practices or relationships."
219
I would argue that this principle is particularly valuable where social norms mir-
ror those we have explored in India, where there are countless individuals who use
the term "gay" to refer to a sexual behavior alone, not an identity in and of itself.
220
As a prominent public health activist describes:
In India, for the majority of men who have sex with men, per-
sonal identity is not seen as the main [] issue. Behaviours are con-
structed within cultural frameworks of compulsory marriage and
procreation, in terms of homosociability, lack of privacy, extended
and joint family networks and so on. What we have then is a
range of sexualities, a range of homosexualities and homosexual
behaviours, a range of identities that very often are very differently
constructed than in the West.
21
For this reason, many men who have sexual activities with other men, gay-identified
or not, are often married to women in India and elsewhere.2 2 For many, and contrary
2"9 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,574 (2003) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
624 (1996)).
220 See Katyal, supra note 16, at 153.
221 Shivananda Khan, Community Action in Action, 10 NAZ KI PUKAAR 14 (July 1995);
see also Shivananda Khan, Sexuality and Sexual Health in India, 14 NAz KI PUKAAR 15 (July
1996) (making same observation).
222 See Boellstorff, supra note 68, at 489. For example, in Indonesia, despite the existence
of a "gay world," and a relatively less pronounced spectre of legal sanction, the persistence
of marriage appears a "mystery" to the average Western gay man meeting other gay-identified
Indonesian men. Id. at 489-90. As one scholar explained:
Andy identified as gay, explaining that his boyfriend of ten years was
married with two children. When I asked if the boyfriend should get
divorced, he stared in shock: "Of course not. He needs descendants and
a wife. I want to get married in five years - I already have a girlfriend.
You mean you won't marry as long as you live?" When I nodded, the
other men confronted me in astonishment ....
Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
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to many Western perceptions, a "gay" identity (and love relationships between men)
can be viewed as compatible within a heterosexual marriage structure framework. 23
Here, Lawrence presents a view, set forth in both Griswold and Boyd, that mirrors
many of the observations often made by scholars on the function of sovereignty. Like
spatial privacy, sovereignty is about space; it is about a clear delineation between
private and public that empowers the former by separating the latter. To this end,
Lawrence's affirmation of the private carries an additional level of protection that
surpasses the strictures of an expressive, identity-based imperative. Lawrence does
not deny the value of identity, but it emphasizes the value of intimacy within a private
space. This conceptual leap - that individuals can choose to have sexual relations
with members of the same sex, but do not necessarily have to attach public, fixed,
and presentative identities to their behavior, or demand particular formations of legal
recognition for that relationship - is particularly relevant for those who may engage
in same sex sexual conduct, but who fail to adopt expressive identities as gay or les-
bian individuals.224
In making this observation, it is important to remain aware of the multiple limita-
tions of private seclusion. As Kendall Thomas so eloquently wrote, years after Bowers:
Under the existing legal and political regime, gay men and les-
bians are aware that the chief value of the language of privacy is
that it can be used not so much to provide a space for self-discov-
ery, but to provide against the dangers of disclosure. What this
means, I think, is that when gay men and lesbians use the language
of privacy, they do so based on a tactical decision .... [G]iven
their vulnerability, gays and lesbians recognize the more urgent
need for some legal protection which will enable them to avoid
being forced out of what has come to be known as "the closet."2"
Thomas's point, made years ago, still rings completely true today. The question for
our purposes is to recognize that although Lawrence, standing on its own, accom-
plishes this goal, it may not do enough to alter preferences so that individuals will
readily choose to be publicly recognized as part of the gay community; the conferral
of privacy on a sexual act between two people of the same sex still permits the
drawing of a cloak of secrecy around gay and lesbian lives, a point which Thomas
223 See id. at 490.
224 On this point, Richard Mohr has offered a slightly different, and valuable, view. He
argues that for Justice Kennedy, "sexual behavior is constitutionally protected, not on its own,
but because of some relationship that it has to what he goes on to call the 'personal relation-
ship[s]' which 'homosexual persons' 'choose to enter upon."' Mohr, supra note 4, at 373 (alter-
ation in original). In his article, Mohr nicely excavates the necessity of this linkage between
"homosexual sex acts" and "same-sex personal relationships," arguing that it is the relation-
ship that Justice Kennedy seeks to protect (by "moral retrofit," according to Mohr), rather than
the sexual acts alone. Id.
225 Thomas, supra note 43, at 1455 (emphasis in original).
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argues in turn allows heterosexuals to maintain "the epistemological privilege of un-
knowing, '226 of believing that individuals who engage in same-sex sexual or homo-
erotic behavior are invisible when they are in fact imbricated throughout culture and
history.
Even on spatial terms, Lawrence' s version of privacy - or spatial sovereignty,
as we might look at it - has its limitations, particularly in the global context, where
issues of space, identity, and the boundaries between public and private can often
vary widely. Given the disparities among wealth with respect to class and caste, the
notion of privacy is often circumscribed by material limitations. Reaching somewhat
similar conclusions from her work in Taiwan, Cindy Patton writes that
[t]he very concept of public versus private or domestic space on
which the elaboration of American sexual freedom efforts rest,
and around which queer politics' performances have centered, is
radically different in Taiwan. Space is not fundamentally matrixed
as male-female/public-private, as in the United States. 227
Patton's observations suggest that the implicit privatization of sexuality in Lawrence
carries significant repercussions for those who cannot enjoy the protections of pri-
vacy within the home, particularly in a joint family context, as is most often the case
throughout the world.
Further, even if the concept of spatial privacy carries with it a sort of license for
freedom within the home, it is important to explore whether there are implicit limits
to the protection at stake, particularly in cases where sexuality takes on a public
character, e.g., particularly in cases where sexuality is taken out of the bedroom -
as it is so often in the case of individuals throughout the world, who are often married
or unable to utilize their private spaces for consensual sexual encounters for a wide
variety of reasons. 228 As Nan Hunter has aptly noted, situations of "sexual speech"
(solicitation in public space, for example) raise the important question of whether
Lawrence's clear boundaries between private and public space leads to containment,
rather than autonomous expression. 29 Containment does nothing to protect the vast
numbers of men and women who are denied acceptance in public space, and therefore
rely on informal "cruising areas" in order to socialize and network with other sexual
minorities. 3° As Martha Nussbaum insightfully noted, years before Lawrence:
226 Id. at 1455-56.
227 Cindy Patton, Stealth Bombers of Desire, in QUEER GLOBALIZATIONS, supra note 17, at
208.
228 See Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 671, 676-77.
229 See Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1546 (2004).
230 See PUCL-KARNATAKA, supra note 135, at 14.
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[T]he recent tendency to protect homosexual sodomy on grounds
of the privacy of the home suggests a pernicious distinction: if
men have sex in their own dwelling place, it is legally protected.
But if they frequent a bathhouse - even if all the people there
are consenting and non-offended - the act no longer enjoys the
same protection.23'
Even aside from the issue of public sexuality, Lawrence overlooks the fragility of
tethering equality to the division between private and public, particularly given the
fact that anti-gay discrimination often places the recognition of gay and lesbian families
into question (I discuss this factor in the third section).
And then there is the issue of consent itself. The concept of spatial privacy, as
many scholars have noted, can be equally liberating and threatening, depending upon
the circumstances within the boundaries of private space, and the varying bargaining
power of those inside. As Marc Spindelman has cogently asked, "When sexual in-
timacy is thought to be normatively good, the basis for relationships 'more enduring,'
as it is in Lawrence, how can it (also) be a prison of abuse? Can it be? What about
when, not if, in actuality, it is?" 2 As Spindelman writes, Lawrence vindicates
(homo)sexual intimacy by adopting a "like-straight" lens that continually compares,
and then equalizes sexual intimacy between members of the same sex to that of mem-
bers of the opposite sex.233 But this move of equalizing both types of sexual inti-
macy, Spindelman warns, risks overlooking the unpleasant incidence of sexual abuse
in both contexts. "The commonplace that sexual intimacy of the sort Lawrence ap-
proves should be heralded as the measure of non-violation," Spindelman writes, "has
been uncovered as a myth, a way of ignoring and protecting the widespread abuses,
including sexual assault, domestic violence, and sexual abuse of children, by more
powerful partners in intimate relationships, typically, though not exclusively, men. 234
Put more simply, particularly in a global context, privacy does not always mean free-
dom from harm.235
231 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Is Privacy Bad for Women?, BOSTON REV., Apr./May 2000,
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR25.2/nussbaum.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
232 See Marc Spindelnian, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1634-35
(2004). See also Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005), where a plaintiff who brought
an action for injuries caused by herpes infection during sexual intercourse received no relief
due to the Virginia Supreme Court's decision to overturn a fornication statute under Lawrence.
233 Spindelman, supra note 232, at 1619.
234 Id. at 1634.
235 Consider the following:
Privacy is often important, but there can be too much as well as too little
privacy; subordinating as well as equalizing forms of privacy; fairly dis-
tributed, as well as unfairly distributed privacy; privacy used for good, as
well as privacy used for evil; privacy that moves a people forward, and
privacy that moves a people backwards.
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For example, there are several cases that suggest that the veil of privacy can often
be used to obscure the importance of protecting the sexual autonomy of both partners
within the home. Consider, for example, People v. Onofre,236 a case mentioned by
some of the briefs in Lawrence, where the New York Court of Appeals rejected a
man's conviction for consensual sodomy with a seventeen-year-old 231 on the grounds
that the law protected sexual decisions "voluntarily made by adults in a noncommer-
cial, private setting. 238 Though the court drew a solid line between public and private
morality, and rejected the state's exercise of police power within the home, arguing
that no harm from consensual sodomy had been shown,239 it ignored the fact that the
case had actually been precipitated by the seventeen-year-old's allegations of physical
injury as a result of the sexual activity.2' Equally disconcerting is the case of Powell
v. State,24' a case in which the Georgia Supreme Court similarly invalidated the state's
sodomy law on privacy grounds.242 In that case, the defendant Anthony Powell was
accused of having sex with his seventeen-year-old niece against her will. 243 Indeed, as
this case and others show, 244 privacy may be deserving of recognition under Lawrence's
protective aegis, but it may necessitate further limitations within the potential confines
of the home and other private spaces, particularly to protect the more vulnerable.
In a global context, this principle demonstrates that privacy may be necessary,
but certainly not sufficient, for global gay and lesbian equality, in either the public
or the private sphere. Many feminists have launched cogent critiques of the boun-
daries between private and public, pointing out the need for expansive concepts of
state accountability for harms committed by private actors rather than the state.245
Today, the undeniable product of such critiques has enabled the slow erosion of this
previously stalwart division between public and private and also heralded an extension
of state responsibility into previously private spheres.246 It remains to be seen whether
Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175,1200 (2000). See
also MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 1089-90 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence, though having
undoubtably positive legal ramifications, also extends the shield of privacy from heterosexuals
to homosexuals, a situation that might allow inequalities and sexual abuse to flourish). For
more background on the relations between genders, specifically gender inequalities, see CAROLE
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988).
236 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).
237 Id.
238 Id. at 940-41. See also Spindelman, supra note 232, at 1638.
239 Onofre, 415 N.E.2d at 943; see also Hemdndez-Truyol, supra note 4, at 1242-43 (dis-
cussing this case).
240 Herndndez-Truyol, supra note 4, at 1243.
24' 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
242 Id.; see also Spindelman, supra note 232, at 1636-39.
243 Powell, 510 S.E.2d at 20.
244 For a fuller discussion of this case and others, see Hemndez-Truyol, supra note 4, at
1243-44 (citing Powell, 510 S.E.2d 18, and State v. Eastwood, 535 S.E.2d 246 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000)).
245 Indeed, initially, the U.N. system did not consider "acts perpetrated by 'private' actors
and that take place in traditionally private spheres such as the home ... to be human rights
violations." Bond, supra note 218, at 89.
246 Id.
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the sovereignty that Lawrence affords to the home is as readily pierced in times of
necessity.247 According to one Delhi high court, for example, fundamental constitu-
tional rights to equality and freedom have no place in the home; "[i]t is like introdu-
cing a bull in a china shop," the judge wrote, and would "prove to be a ruthless de-
stroyer of the marriage institution."248
B. Deliberative Autonomy
Like the private and public boundaries explored in Lawrence, sovereignty has
both inward and outward facets.249 The outward aspects, like the findings in Lawrence
and Griswold, focus on a particular type of "freedom from outside interference," as
discussed above.25 ° In contrast, internal sovereignty entails the exercise of authority
within certain, circumscribed boundaries, in order to permit governments to provide
political goods for citizens.25' It draws substantially upon elements of self-deter-
mination, which involves the right of individuals and groups to "freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
252
Viewed within this prism, Lawrence strikingly reaffirms both the internal and
external aspects of sovereignty, but it does so by noting a critical link to personal
self-determination. In doing so, it offers a striking parallel with contemporary discus-
sions of sexual autonomy. As Stephen Schulhofer has emphasized, sexual autonomy
centers on the freedom to seek sexual fulfillment and freedom from sexual coercion.
253
It is the product of a complex interaction of conditions, requiring mental competency,
an awareness of one's options, and sufficient information to choose between various
possibilities, i.e., whether or not to become sexually intimate with another person.254
Schulhofer also defines sexual autonomy in terms of (1) an internal dimension, invol-
ving the moral and intellectual capacity to choose without impermissible pressures
and limitations; (2) an external dimension involving a "freedom from impermissible
247 See Spindelman, supra note 232, at 1653-50.
248 Nussbaum, supra note 231 (quoting the Delhi High Court in HarvinderKaurv. Harmander
Singh).
249 See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OFCONFLICTING RIGHTS (rev. ed. 1996); JACKSON, supra note 177, at 28;
KRASNER, supra note 177, at 43-72.
250 JACKSON, supra note 177, at 27. See also HANNUM, supra note 249, at 15 ("Many
writers essentially equate sovereignty with independence, the fundamental authority of a state
to exercise its powers without being subservient to any outside authority.").
251 See JACKSON supra note 177, at 29.
252 ICCPR, supra note 179, at art. 1. See also the U.N. Declaration of Friendly Relations,
G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, at 124, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc A/5217 (Oct.
24, 1970). "The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely
determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by
that people." Id.
253 STEVEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEx: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF LAW 111 (1998).
254 See id.
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pressures and constraints"; 2 5 and (3) a physical dimension, comprising the bodily inte-
grity of a person. 56
Contemporary understandings of sovereignty, both personal and national, under-
score the vital, mutually supporting interchange between its internal and external
facets.257 Like sovereignty itself, the home functions as a discrete, delineated space,
free from state intrusion and intervention, allowing the individual a sort of "breathing
space" from which to develop oneself outside of public view.5  Like Schulhofer's
own discussion, Lawrence' s postulation of sexual autonomy can be easily extended
to the realm of sexual identity. Schulhofer defines sexual autonomy in terms of an
"active" facet - namely, the right to determine the kind of life one wishes to live,
and the kind of activities one may wish to pursue - and in terms of a "right of
refusal" - involving the right to refuse to undertake certain activities with others. 259
Likewise, this version of sexual autonomy also recognizes the role that social con-
ditions - cultural influences, education, the realistic availability of alternative options,
and a culture that supports personal introspection - can have an enormous impact
on ensuring a person's autonomous decisions.26
I would argue that many of Schulhofer's descriptions find pride of place within a
utopian reading of Lawrence. Along these lines, others have suggested that Lawrence
offers a version of sexual self-determination that enables and protects the individual's
own deliberative process. 26' Francisco Valdes has written that Lawrence "responds
to the regulation of sexuality" by recognizing the fluid and constitutive part of self-
realization which honors the ongoing search for meaning and individual personhood
that can be fashioned, in part, through sexual interaction with another person.262 The
opinion actually defines liberty to presume "an autonomy of self that includes free-
dom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct." '263 By placing auto-
nomy along the same continuum as liberty and privacy, the Court suggests a vision
that is, again, equally balanced between positive and negative facets: it encompasses
the freedom to choose and to deliberate, along with the spatial and emotional freedom
to do so. Lawrence relied heavily on the Casey decision in this respect, observing
that Casey "confirmed that our laws and tradition afforded constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing, and education."264 Constitutionally speaking, the deliberative auto-
nomy framework includes the right to privacy, expressive association, and intimate
association in constitutional law.265 Initially defined by Justice Blackmun in Planned
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See HANNUM, supra note 249, at 1 n. 1, 15; see also JAMEs CRAWFORD, THE CREATION
OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (1979).
258 See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 578 (2003).
259 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 253, at 110-11.
260 Id.
261 See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 4, at 1396.
262 id.
263 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
264 Id. at 573-74.
265 James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995).
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Parenthood v. Casey,2 6 the right of privacy included "'the principle that personal
decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny should be largely
beyond the reach of government.'"
267
According to James Fleming, these observations in Casey, which highlight both
decisional autonomy and bodily integrity, "evince[] deliberative autonomy."2' 6 The
same can also be said for Stevens's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, which mentions
the "individual's right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect
his own, or his family's destiny," and "the abiding interest in individual liberty that
makes certain state intrusions on the citizen's right to decide how he will live his
own life intolerable., 269 The same observation is also made by Justice Blackmun,
who characterizes (as Fleming points out) the "'freedom of intimate association"'
to include the "'decisional and the spatial aspects of the right to privacy.""'27 In
Fleming's view, rights that involve bodily integrity, decisional autonomy, and inte-
grity - involving "persons' destiny, identity, or way of life" - constitute "basic
liberties that are significant preconditions for deliberative autonomy.
271
Lawrence continues to affirm this position. The Court, for example, quoted from
a passage of the Casey opinion that observed that
[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.272
The Lawrence court then observed that "[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may
seek autonomy for these [same] purposes, just as heterosexual persons do., 27 3 As
this observation implicitly suggests, instead of concentrating on sexual identity, the
Court chooses to concentrate on sexual autonomy as a framework for legal protection.
As such cases suggest, these liberties (regarding destiny, identity, and way of life)
become even more important when we consider the boundaries of the contested
intersections between sexual identity and sexual activity in the global arena. Just as
bodily integrity comprises a certain type of personal sovereignty that is inviolate, a
framework for deliberative sexual autonomy permits individuals to make their own
266 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
267 Fleming, supra note 265, at 11 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part)).
268 Id.
269 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270 Fleming, supra note 265, at 10 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 202, 204 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
27 Id. at 13 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716,719-20 (7th Cir. 1975).
272 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
273 id.
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decisions about how or whether or not they choose to adopt or express a particular
type of sexual identity. This kind of "sexual self-determination" draws a boundary
that allows persons to undertake their own process of deliberation to ultimately decide
how they may choose to represent themselves.274 Since sexual autonomy includes
the right to make one's decisions about bodily integrity and sexual self-satisfaction,
it also necessarily includes a decision about public and private identity in this regard.
Given these principles, I argue that Lawrence's deliberative autonomy frame-
work differs from the other types of rights we have examined, particularly because
of its emphasis on privacy rather than the imperative of expressive identity. For
example, Lawrence's framework takes the right of privacy a step further by allowing
an individual a kind of "inviolate space" for making decisions about how or whether
to identify oneself sexually. In reaching these conclusions, Lawrence's framework
peacefully coexists with identity-based models; it is entirely possible to construe the
right to privacy to include both the deliberative and expressive aspects of a person's
sexual identity. In this way, Lawrence's sexual autonomy model is most clearly akin
to the original goals and objectives of the gay liberation movement, which initially
was understood as a multi-intersectional movement that connected threads of various
struggles. 75 A sexual autonomy model does just that: it equalizes one's sexual and
identity preferences by focusing on the act of choosing, rather than the gender or
identity chosen, as a focal point of protection. Here, Lawrence's deliberative sexual
autonomy framework provides a much more expansive view of protection, encom-
passing both the internal and external aspects of a person.
While this vision of deliberative autonomy might be laudatory at first glance,
it is important not to overstate my optimism. As Robert Post eloquently observed,
"the theme of autonomy floats weightlessly through Lawrence, invoked but never
endowed with analytic traction." '276 Perhaps most troubling is the evidence that some
courts consider the power of Lawrence to be strictly limited to the dynamics between
adult, same-sex couples, and thus exclude other issues that closely bear on a broader,
and more fundamental, right to sexual intimacy. Consider the unfortunate case of State
v. Limon,277 which involved a conviction against an eighteen-year-old boy who en-
gaged in consensual oral sex with a fourteen-year-old just a week after his eighteenth
birthday.27 8 Limon was convicted under a statute that prohibited sodomy with a child
between the ages of fourteen and sixteen. 279 Although Kansas had a "Romeo and
Juliet" law that reduced penalties if the older teen was less than nineteen and if the
age difference was less than four years, the law did not apply to members of the same
274 See also Kristen L. Walker, Evolving Human Rights Norms Around Sexuality, 6 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 343 (2000).
275 See ANNAMARIE JAGOSE, QUEER THEORY 34-35 (1996). Here, in pointing out that gen-
der and sex roles oppress everyone, not just gay people, gay liberationists seek "not only recog-
nition of homosexuality as a legitimate identity for a minority population but also to 'free the
homosexual in everyone."' Id. at 40.
276 Post, supra note 26, at 97.
277 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005).
278 Id. at 24.
279 Id.
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sex. 280 Even in the wake of Lawrence, Limon's conviction was initially upheld on the
grounds that the gender classification was valid on rational basis grounds. 28 ' Later,
the case was overturned,28 2 but it still demonstrates the limited power of Lawrence in
the wake of countervailing concerns involving gender or the rights of youth.
Indeed, one might even argue that Lawrence's failure to articulate a specific,
fundamental right to sexual intimacy anticipates a host of obstacles regarding the
exercise of deliberative sexual autonomy entirely. This is particularly true regarding
types of non-normative sexual activity that may fall outside hetero- or homo-sexual
coupling, either in public or private space. Consider, for example, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit case of Williams v. Attorney General ofAlabama,283 which addressed the consti-
tutionality of an Alabama law that prohibited, among other things, the commercial
distribution of "'any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimu-
lation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value.' 284 In that case, the
Eleventh Circuit resoundingly rejected the existence of a right to privacy or personal
autonomy, observing that, "[i]n the abstract.., there is no fundamental right to
either. ''285 In doing so, the court refused to invoke strict scrutiny analysis, and instead
analyzed the statute on rational basis scrutiny alone.286 It relied on an earlier Eleventh
Circuit case that held that Lawrence did not identify a fundamental right to private
sexual intimacy, because it failed to offer the requisite level of talismanic description.287
It then criticized the district court for finding a right to sexual privacy, noting that
the district court's formulation "encompasse[d] a great universe of sexual activities,
including many that historically have been, and continue to be, prohibited. 2 88 It
cited prostitution, obscenity, and adult incest as examples that would fall within this
right.289 In making this observation, the court was careful to define the right at issue
to involve the right to purchase and sell sexual devices, arguing that "[t]he statute in-
vades the privacy of Alabama residents in their bedrooms no more than does any sta-
tute restricting the availability of commercial products for use in private quarters as
sexual enhancements,, 290 comparing these aids to a bevy of illegal aids - the services
of a willing prostitute, hallucinogens, or depictions of child pornography, for example.29'
280 id.
281 See id. at 25-27.
282 Id. at 24.
283 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
284 See id. at 1233 (quoting ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (Supp. 2003)).
281 Id. at 1235.
286 Id. at 1236.
287 Id. (citing Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11 th
Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida's law banning gay men and lesbians from adopting children)).
288 Id. at 1239-40.
289 Id. at 1240.
290 Id. at 1241.
291 Id. at 1241 n.12. Yet paradoxically, at the same time that the court reached such proble-
matic conclusions, it also noted that restrictions on the sale of such items were, in fact, tanta-
mount to restrictions on the use of the item, citing Carey v. Population Services International,
431 U.S. 678 (1977), which observed that the same test had to be applied to state regulations
which burden an individual's right as those which prohibit the right entirely. Williams, 378
F.3d 1242.
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The court criticized the district court's equation of historical non-interference
with regulating sexual devices with protection, observing that state non-interference
nowhere suggested such protection. 292 "Under this approach," the court observed,
"the freedom to smoke, to pollute, to engage in private discrimination, to commit
marital rape - at one time or another - all could have been elevated to fundamental-
rights status.,,293 Given the historical existence of the "Comstock laws" regulating
the trade and circulation of obscene literature and articles of immoral use, the court
concluded that Lawrence's import could not immunize such conduct, even within
the home, as a fundamental right.294 In this case, we see clear limitations on the ex-
ercise of deliberative autonomy, implicit in Lawrence's soaring rhetoric. But the real
victims here are, as Mary Anne Case has aptly noted, women:
Everything about the case genders the use of sex aids as female
and feminine: The "vendor plaintiffs" are women who appear to
market their wares largely to other women, either at "in-house
'Tupperware' style parties... [for] sexual aids and novelties" or
in retail stores featuring "romance enhancing products and novel-
ties".... Among the user plaintiffs are a married couple and ano-
ther married woman "who uses sexual devices during intimate re-
lations with her husband." Even more extraordinarily, also among
the user plaintiffs and the customers of the vendor plaintiffs and
given a no less sympathetic hearing by the lower court are single
women who "prefer to avoid sexual relations with others, due to
prior negative relationships, or the risks of sexually transmitted
diseases, or other risks associated with developing an intimate re-
lationship."29
Taking Case's observations at their core, it becomes clear that Lawrence's version
of sexual sovereignty implies a particular combination of "respectable" coupling in
order to become effective.2 96 We see that Lawrence's lack of specificity offers a limited
vision of sexual self-determination; it fails to offer any clear positive protections beyond
same-sex sexual activity within the home, and thus may fail to protect other vulnerable
groups throughout the world: women seeking "aided orgasm ' 297 (as Case puts it so
eloquently) or teenagers engaged in homoerotic, consensual sexual activity. In sum,
Lawrence reaffirms the sovereignty of the home without expressly affirming the parallel
need for the sovereignty of the universal person: adult, teenager, male, female, or other-
wise. In doing so, this omission, as we now see, fails to protect parallel activities that
292 Williams, 378 F.3d at 1244.
293 id.
294 Id. at 1245.
295 Case, supra note 4, at 132-33 (footnotes omitted) (first omission and first alteration in
original).
296 See Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What Is Left of Sodomy After
Lawrence v. Texas?, 23 SocIAL TEXT 235, 238-39 (2005).
297 Case, supra note 4, at 131.
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raise similar questions regarding the exercise and protection of sexual autonomy. In
short, Lawrence winds up offering a right to sexual autonomy that is both fragile and
vulnerable; as such, it risks leaving the less powerful unrecognized in either public or
private space. At the same time, however, its rhetorical flourish suggests that it may
serve as the starting point for a more fruitful explication of sexual autonomy at a later
date.
C. Expressive Liberty
The final part of Lawrence's tripartite prism involves expressive liberty. Here, the
Lawrence Court extends the notion of spatial privacy outward, linking spatial principles
of privacy to its comparably more substantive aspects. 298 This important linkage
between the "spatial" and "transcendent" notions of privacy then transfers into the zone
of liberty.299 After observing the importance of spatial privacy as a theatrical backdrop
of its findings, the Court then points out that "there are other spheres of our lives and
existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence.
Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds."' It defined the case before it to involve the
"liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions."301
Indeed, the most striking aspect of the opinion is perhaps its central emphasis on
liberty, rather than privacy.3 2 This transition from spatial notions of privacy towards
a freedom that extends into areas of human self-actualization suggests the rising signi-
ficance of a notion of liberty that is both expressive and normative in its significance,
denoting a particular type of "expressive liberty." As applied to the person, internal
sovereignty, as I have described it, also operates within the self, allowing the person to
determine for himself or herself which aspects of their personhood to develop, empha-
size, and express, either through associations with others or through the individual ex-
pression (or not) of certain aspects of their character. Capturing this point, Laurence
Tribe observes that the failure of the Court to name specifics "reflects the Court's reco-
gnition that it was not attaching rights to spatial intersections or to configurations of
body parts; instead, the Court was protecting the right of adults to define for themselves
the borders and contents of deeply personal human relationships."3 3 Obviously, how-
ever, the framework of deliberative autonomy and expressive liberty that is offered falls
on cultural and social norms for its execution and attainment. Here perhaps is where
298 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
299 Id.
30 Id.
301 id.
302 Many scholars have focused at great length on this point. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra
note 4, at 676; see also Koppelman, supra note 4, at 1173-74 ("The Court also limited its hold-
ing in other ways, by conspicuously ignoring legal arguments that were stronger and more
persuasive than the mushy right-to-liberty argument.. . ."); Mohr, supra note 4, at 368 ("[T]he
Court gives no account of how substantive privacy rights are grounded in due process.").
303 Tribe, supra note 4, at 1915.
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we see the greatest possible divergence from its objectives and its limitations - and the
most striking import for Lawrence's global effectiveness.
The Bowers Court held that the Constitution does not protect a "right of homosexu-
als to engage in acts of sodomy," nor, alternatively, did it contain a "fundamental right
to engage in homosexual sodomy."' The Court rejected the proposition that the right
to privacy as outlined in its prior jurisprudence on procreation, marriage, child rearing
and education, and abortion extended to homosexual sodomy.35 Justice White wrote:
[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced in those
cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this
case. No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on
the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been de-
monstrated ... 306
If privacy provided the backdrop for Bowers' reasoning, liberty served as the
vehicle by which Bowers was overturned. The Lawrence Court, for example, noted
that, by construing the original question in Bowers to be whether the Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy demonstrated "the
Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake." 3  The Bowers
Court defined fundamental rights as "those fundamental liberties that are 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty norjustice would exist if [they]
were sacrificed."'" It then concluded that it was "obvious" that neither formulation
would extend to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy, principally
because proscriptions against homosexual conduct have "ancient roots" and were cri-
minalized in nearly half of the states at the time the opinion was written." Because the
laws against sodomy were based on "notions of morality," the Bowers Court then decli-
ned to overturn the law due to its majoritarian origins. °
In analyzing this part of Bowers, the Lawrence Court observed that:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put for-
ward, just as it would demean a married couple were to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The
laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that
304 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
305 See id. at 190.
'06 Id. at 190-91.
37 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
308 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326
(1937)) (alteration in original).
309 Id. at 192-94.
310 Id. at 193-94, 196.
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purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their
penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching conse-
quences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes
do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not en-
titled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of per-
sons to choose without being punished as criminals."'
Throughout these observations, the Court emphasized the function of privacy in its
spatial and transcendent dimensions - but placed them both under the rubric of liberty.
This shift is tremendously significant - it simultaneously emphasizes the expressive
significance of sodomy laws, just as it highlights the expressive value of sexual
behavior between two consenting adults in a relationship.
We might wonder whether the absence of focus on public, expressive identities in
Lawrence suggests the need for containment; of implicitly keeping same-sex sexual
identities in the bedroom (or the closet, as the case may be). As Francisco Valdes notes,
"Lawrence thereby moves sexual minorities into an interstitial place in constitutional
law - from the status of formal outlaws but shy of the status of formal recognition; a
traditionally subordinated social group now to be tolerated, but not necessarily
accepted.'312 The implicit theme of containment, as I have suggested, is deeply
contradictory and multi-faceted: while it may seclude and therefore protect the emer-
gence of sexuality within the home, it carries no protections in public space, nor does
it call for any other degree of public entitlements that encourage the dynamism that
surrounds group visibility through "coming out." As Berta Hern~mdez-Truyol aptly
observes: "[T]he sexually private location of Lawrence is dangerously close to the bad
privacy of the closet. If the decision means that only hidden gay (and lesbian) existence
will obtain constitutional protection, gays' and lesbians' and their families' lives will
continue to be rife with danger., 313 For support, Hernndez-Truyol points to a case
where a lesbian family was broken up due to the existence of same-sex affection within
the confines of the home,14 and Justice Scalia's Lawrence dissent which trumpeted the
observation that many "Americans" wish to "and should be able to legitimately exclude
gays and lesbians" from a wide variety of public and private places - work, schools,
religious institutions, and street parades.315 Indeed, her predictions have, sadly, come
to pass in (again) the Eleventh Circuit, which upheld a Florida adoption ban directed
specifically at lesbians and gay men, partly on the grounds that Lawrence did not
"identif[y] a new fundamental right to private sexual intimacy." '316
3" Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
312 Valdes, supra note 4, at 1342.
313 Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 4, at 1241.
314 Id.
315 id.
316 Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,815-17 (1 th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
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Thus, Lawrence's unabashed affirmation of the boundaries between public and
private raises the important question of what sorts of protections attach to sexual ex-
pressions between members of the same sex in public, and whether the extension of
privacy protections to sodomy laws carries with it an implicit desire to contain, to se-
clude, and to hide gay and lesbian social and sexual expression from the public sphere.
On this larger issue, Lawrence provides an insufficient answer. After quickly noting
the importance of spatial privacy as a theatrical backdrop for its findings, the Court
notes that "there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where
the State should not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds."
317
Spatial privacy - a grant on its own - answers none of these important questions
regarding the public; it instead relegates everything to the private.
One could argue that the Court offered the sexual minority community a largely
toothless version of external sovereignty. The Court's version merely offers the prin-
ciple of inviolability of boundaries, assuming, of course, that this protects the principle
of "domesticated liberty" within the home.3 18 Missing from this formulation is the true
notion of external sovereignty, a term that is normally used to encompass the notion of
equality in relationships to other entities, including the right to belong to membership
organizations, the right to sign international agreements and to abide by international
principles, and the capacity to act as a legal entity in consort with other nation-states.31 9
External sovereignty, as international law has taught us so well, requires, at the
very minimum, some formal equality within the membership of nations to flourish.
The same, therefore, is also true of the self- a factor which suggests the need for true
equality in areas of marriage, family, expression, and anti-discrimination. Yet the Law-
rence Court, on this point, misses the mark. It merely declares that its previous juris-
prudence recognized the principle that "the right to make certain decisions regarding
sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship."'3 2 It then drew upon other
decisions regarding a woman's liberty right under the Due Process Clause, observing
that Roe, for example, "recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental
decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed once more that the protection of liberty
under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance
in defining the rights of the person. 321 At the same time, the Court pointed out that the
sodomy statutes "seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to
formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals. '32 2 In reaching this observation, the Court noted that adults are
free to choose to enter upon a homosexual relationship "in the confines of their homes
317 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
318 Cf Franke, supra note 4, at 1413.
319 See Williams & Heymann, supra note 198, at 443.
320 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (recognizing the impact of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965)).
321 Id. at 565.
322 Id. at 567.
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and their own private lives." '323 "When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate con-
duct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that
is more enduring."324 The liberty protected by the Constitution, the Court observed,
permits this choice.3"
It is easy to see how significant this transition is from spatial privacy, to marital
privacy, to expressive privacy, and then, finally, to expressive liberty. Here, the Court
emphasized not only the private nature of sexual relationships, but also highlighted the
expressive functions that sexuality may serve within a relationship. In this sense, the
Lawrence Court honored a conception of the self that is premised on protecting the
ability to choose to enter into a personal relationship with a member of the same sex
and highlights the expressive significance of sexual activity in catalyzing the bonds
between humans. In making this recognition, Lawrence also rejected many of the
historical premises upon which Bowers was based.326 But it also carried a theme of
global cosmopolitanism throughout the opinion, highlighting the fact that other
jurisdictions, including those of various states, have rejected sodomy laws.
Much can be made of the Court's observation that sodomy laws seek to control a
personal relationship, whether or not it is entitled to formal legal recognition in the
law.327 From my perspective, leaving the question of legal recognition unsettled allows
for a discursive emphasis on the expressive function of sexuality itself in providing a
formidable bond between persons. This referential function has been deeply contested
by scholars who have argued that it masks an underlying theme throughout Lawrence
in implicitly requiring same-sex relationships to demonstrate intimacy, monogamy, or
other heteronormative qualities.328 In this sense, one might argue that the function of
sexuality, within the premises of a spatially private space, might be able to serve a
similar function to marriage itself: it provides for a type of expression that is valuable,
and, as Lawrence plainly recognizes, clearly within the liberty of persons to choose.
Again, one might argue that Lawrence's conflation of liberty with privacy is a
significant development, particularly as it relates to the creation of identity itself. It
does not require the assertion of a public identity in order to protect a private sphere, but
instead uses the value of a private sphere to honor both the public and private choices
of individuals. Expressive liberty, then, goes one step further than expressive identity:
it permits the choice of with whom to have sexual relations, how to identify oneself, and
whether or not the relationships one chooses should be publicly recognized. This
notion embraces a corollary principle of "sexual self-determination," a key concept that
animates the foundations of Lawrence. We also see elements of preference-shaping
323 Id.
324 id.
325 See id.
326 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-73 (rejecting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-95
(1986)).
327 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Ball, supra note 4.
328 See Ruskola, supra note 296, at 236-38.
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behavior in the Court's observations that lesbians and gay men are "entitled to re-
spect 329 and to "retain their dignity as free persons." 3" According to Carlos Ball, these
observations suggest a subtle expansiveness in the Court's concerns with liberty:
The Court, to put it differently, could have applied a minimalist
libertarian understanding of the Due Process Clause in matters of
sexual intimacy by simply concluding that because the sexual acts
at issue in the case were consensual, took place in the privacy of
the home, and did not harm third parties, they were constitutionally
protected. The Court, by bringing into the analysis notions of re-
spect and dignity in the context of gay lives and relationships, went
beyond such minimalism. 3
31
To go beyond such minimalism, I would posit, demonstrates the implicit promise
of a new, institutional role for courts in establishing the boundaries of dignity, privacy,
and liberty for its citizens. It suggests, as Professor Ball also does, a role that engages
in protecting rights that are positive, rather than negative, in character, and in actively
protecting the dignitary interests of all of its citizens, sexual minorities included.
At the same time, however, we must recognize that the implicit logic of contain-
ment still creates a hierarchical divergence between private and public recognition, as
we have seen in the various case law in its wake. As both Katherine Franke and Mary
Anne Case have insightfully pointed out, Lawrence lends itself to a type of liberty that
is privatized, and therefore dangerously affirms the home, at the cost of a greater and
more powerful recognition in public space.332 Case law, as both suggest, has already
suggested the possibility of this outcome in Stanley v. Georgia,333 a case where the
Supreme Court held that the right to information prohibits making mere private po-
ssession of obscene material a crime. 3 In that case, the Court recognized that the valid
governmental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity could not justify its
insulation from other constitutional rights, particularly those implicated in a statute
forbidding the mere possession of obscene materials. 335 As the Stanley Court observed:
This right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their
social worth, is fundamental to our free society. Moreover, in the
context of this case - a prosecution for mere possession of printed
329 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.
The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime.").
330 Id. at 567.
33 Ball, supra note 4, at 1215.
332 See generally Franke, supra note 4. See also Case, supra note 4.
333 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
334 id.
331 Id. at 563-68.
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or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own home - that
right takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the
right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from un-
wanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.336
Yet, as Katherine Franke aptly notes, in Stanley, "the Court tolerated obscenity at the
price of demeaning it, characterizing it as 'a base thing that should nonetheless be
tolerated so long as it takes place in private."' ,337 Franke's worried analogy to Lawrence
is striking - the logic of containment may operate, though implicitly, in Lawrence, to
suggest that same-sex sexuality is only valued, and valuable, as long as it takes place
within the confines of the home.
Of course, given the breadth the Court provides to its formulation of expressive
liberty, it is important to recognize its public and private limits in the global arena, just
as the Court has done in its own jurisprudence in the First Amendment area. In short,
Lawrence does little to protect expressive liberty and inclusion in public spaces, or even
public organizations. Applying these observations to the global arena, we can see some
risk that Lawrence heralds a limited success for lesbian and gay equality within
securing access to public spaces and recognition. Speaker autonomy (even of the ho-
mophobic variety) continues to receive primary status.338 Under Lawrence, gay mar-
riage is but a mixed mirage of possibility with a hint towards legal recognition for gay
and lesbian families. And, as some cases suggest, the regulation of same-sex sexuality
within public spaces - bathrooms, parks, and the like - will continue unabated. In
short, Lawrence's failure to offer a robust conception of public, rather than private, pro-
tection signals its global limitations.
Consider the recent case law challenging the military's anti-sodomy rules, which
have resoundingly deferred to the military despite clear liberty and privacy issues.339
And the Supreme Court has rarely been willing to demand inclusion in public spaces
for cultural dissent. For example, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-
sexual Group of Boston, Inc.,' the Court considered whether the application of a state
public accommodations law requiring the inclusion of gay and lesbian parade marchers
violated the parade organizers' First Amendment rights.-" The Court found that it did
violate the organizers' rights, observing that "whatever the reason [for the chosen ex-
clusion], it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of
view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control." 34 2
336 Id. at 564 (internal citation omitted).
33' Franke, supra note 4, at 1407 (quoting Michael J. Sandel, MoralArgument and Liberal
Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REv. 521, 537 (1989)).
338 See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REv. 495, 506 (2001).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Stirewalt, 60 MJ. 297 (C.A.A.F. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 1682 (2005); United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
340 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
341 Id.
342 Id. at 575.
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More recently, the Court continued to emphasize the limitations of expressive
liberty in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.343 The question presented in that case was
whether a state public accommodations law violated the Boy Scouts' right to ban homo-
sexuals from serving as Boy Scouts under its First Amendment rights of expressive
association.' Significantly, the Scouts' own position, which initially proscribed homo-
sexual conduct, and later homosexual status, traces the judicial emphasis we have dis-
cussed. In 1991, the Boy Scouts tailored their message of exclusivity to maintain that
"'homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a
Scout be morally straight and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word and deed,
and that homosexuals do not provide a desirable role model for Scouts.' "35 Yet just
two years later, the Boy Scouts redrafted their position to state instead that "[w]e do not
believe that homosexuals provide a role model consistent with the[] expectations" that
Scouting families have had of the organization. 3 6
Here, too, the Court concluded that the inclusion of an openly gay scoutmaster ran
afoul of the Scouts' freedom of expressive association, because it would change the
message that it chooses to send: "The presence of an avowed homosexual and gay
rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly different message
from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disa-
greeing with Boy Scouts policy."347 Here, the Court made it perfectly clear that the
mere presence of a "gay rights" activist openly questioned the policy, irrespective of
whether or not he actively chose to do so.
In recognizing this jurisprudence within the confines of Lawrence's expressive
liberty, the Court has implicitly drawn a line between private and public, protecting
private acts, and a person's chosen identity, but only within certain circumscribed boun-
daries. The suggestion made by the Court is that expressive liberty is a right that is
enjoyed by everyone, but in times of conflict between two speakers, the Court will
refuse to demand inclusion, and instead defer to the author, even if the author has
chosen to exclude particular identities for discriminating reasons.
III. BEYOND SOVEREIGN RECOGNITION
Despite its limitations, Lawrence still represents a powerful, indeed, inspirational,
precedent that dynamically positions the United States as part of an increasingly global
constituency that has chosen to recognize the role of liberty, privacy, and autonomy in
issues concerning same-sex sexuality. Perhaps its greatest effect, therefore, lies not in
the excavation of its executory promise, but rather in its placement as what Robert Post
has termed "the opening bid in a conversation that the Court expects to hold with the
American public."' '3 8 But, as I have suggested, the conversation needs to unfold on both
34' 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
3" id.
34' Id. at 652.
346 Id.
147 Id. at 655-56.
348 Post, supra note 26, at 104.
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a macro and micro level, both globally and within the home, if this conversation is to
be at all effective. As Charles Taylor has beautifully argued, the discovery of one's
self-identity doesn't just mean that one negotiates it in isolation, but rather, it is con-
structed and mediated through dialogue, both internal and external, with others.349 This
is why identities need both dialogue and recognition.3 °
In this section, I will argue for the protection of a robust conception of intersec-
tionality, post-Lawrence, that centers upon this value of crossing from private solace
to public recognition. Intersectionality, as defined by Kimberle Crenshaw, focuses on
the principle that aspects of identity, such as race and gender, do not operate indepen-
dently of one another, but are instead part and parcel of a person's lived experience.51
Both anti-essentialism and intersectionality involve a complex, fluid notion of the self,
one that recognizes that "race, gender, and sexual orientation are not fixed, biological
characteristics. ' As Joanna Bond observes, "Intersectionality facilitates such a recog-
nition and encourages analysis of human rights as they affect the whole person or com-
plex 'self rather than providing only a snapshot of identity frozen behind the lens of
either gender, race, or sexual orientation." '353
On one hand, as I have argued, Lawrence's emphasis on the protection of conduct
is globally appealing because it surpasses the tenuous fragility of expressive identity,
and instead focuses on the need for freedom from interference instead. In addition,
Lawrence honors a vision of sexual self-determination that, unlike the dominant impe-
ratives of expressive identity, allows for a potential deliberative space between one's
private, sexual activities and one's choices of self-definition. As I have suggested, re-
cognizing these areas of potential disaggregation is vital in order to protect individuals
across the world who may face legal sanction due to the existence of sodomy laws, even
when they do not adopt expressively "gay," "lesbian," or "bisexual" identities. In an
extremely powerful article, Ryan Goodman makes a similar point with reference to
South Africa, whose empirical study of the effects of decriminalization demonstrates
the constitutive effects of sodomy laws on gay and lesbian identity formation. 4 His
work shows that the presence of legal prohibition of sodomy laws, far from having a
purely symbolic effect, has also had a profoundly negative effect on the social, ex-
pressive, and constitutive elements of gay self-identification.3 5 At the same time, how-
ever, Goodman's work also demonstrates the lasting effects of decriminalization on
both the personal and political aspects of gay personhood, a point that squarely applies
to the events in the wake of Lawrence as well.
" See Taylor, supra note 77, at 34.
350 Id.
351 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244-45 n.9 (1991); see also
Robert S. Chang & Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., After Intersectionality, 71 UMKC L. REv.
485 (2002).
352 Bond, supra note 218, at 109.
311 Id. at 137.
354 See Goodman, supra note 115.
355 Id.
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But this right, as I have suggested, is primarily a representational one: while it goes
a long way in removing the stigma of criminality from homosexuality, it does little to
formally affirm the recognition in public entitlements, like marriage or domestic part-
nership. Here, I want to suggest the need for a radical type of intersectionality post-
Lawrence, one that instead actively engages with the dynamics of public and private
entitlements regarding individual and group identity. There is a need to bring same-sex
sexuality out into the open - not for all, but for some, who seek to identify with a com-
munity. This project, if it is to be effective, requires creating the necessary conditions
that recognize full equality in citizenship for the panoply of sexualities throughout the
world, rather than requiring alliegiance to particular categories of expressive identity.
Amy Gutmann has argued that "[i]f human identity is dialogically created," then true
public recognition requires a deliberative space that allows us to share aspects of our
identity publicly with others.356 Part of this requires recognizing the rich intersectional
nature of individual experience. For example, Angela Harris, in her seminal article
entitled Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, echoes the need for "multiple
consciousness" in feminist thought.3 57 Her work points out that black women have
called into question the notion of a unitary women's experience by pointing out how
difficult it is to assume that a monolithic women's experience can be described inde-
pendent of other facets like race, class, and sexual orientation.5 The result of essential-
ism, Harris writes, is a reduction in the lives of women who would experience multiple
forms of impression, forcibly fragmenting the rich intertextual natures of their exper-
iences.359
In one particularly rich example, Harris points to Catharine MacKinnon' s reading36°
of the case Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo,36' a case in which Julie Martinez sued her
Native American tribe to challenge an ordinance that provided that if women married
outside of the tribe, the resulting children were not considered full members of the
tribe. 62 In contrast, if men married outside of the tribe, their children were considered
to be full members.363 Since Martinez married a Navajo man, her children were not
allowed to vote or to inherit communal land.3 4
In her commentary, MacKinnon has Martinez ask her tribe, "Why do you make me
choose between my equality as woman and my cultural identity?,, 365 using the question
to provocatively frame the importance of gender equity and pointing out that "the
356 Amy Gutmann, Introduction to MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 77, at 7.
317 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581,587 (1990).
358 Id. at 589.
359 Id.
360 See CATHARINE MACKINNON, Whose Culture: A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo (1983), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIsCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 63 (1987).
361 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
362 Id.
363 See id. at 51.
364 Id. at 52.
365 MACKINNON, supra note 360, at 67.
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aspiration of women to be no less than men.., is an aspiration indigenous to women
across place and across time."3" Harris takes up MacKinnon's critique, reminding
MacKinnon that "though the aspiration may be everywhere the same, its expression
must depend on the social historical circumstances" that frame the location of the
question itself.367 Harris's contribution, therefore, leads us to focus on the confusing
and comparably less static identities that operate in the foreground of the conflict
between womanhood and culture. "In ajurisprudence based on multiple consciousness,
rather than the unitary consciousness of MacKinnon's dominance theory," she writes,
"these questions would have to be answered before the ordinance could be considered
on its merits and even before the Court's decision to stay out could be evaluated."'
To some extent, Harris's suggestion should rightfully operate at the forefront of our
discussions regarding sexuality and culture. As many gay, lesbian, bisexual, or trans-
gendered South Asians often explain, the world forces them to choose between multiple
identities - gender, race, sexual orientation, cultural expectation - themes that indi-
viduals grapple with in both private and public spaces and across time. Yet, the nomen-
clature of each category is rarely questioned, even though it raises poignant and con-
flicting representations. In the end, many individuals may find that navigating such
complicated spaces requires a dynamic, fluid picture, rather than a single, fixed identity
that presupposes the importance of some identities at the expense of others. As Ryan
Goodman's work clearly shows, this ongoing project is not an enterprise that flourishes
outside of state intervention; rather, state intervention is intimately connected to every
aspect of both personhood and representation.369 Consequently, what we need is a
greater recognition of how protecting the public aspects of identity leads to a greater
protection of the private self, and vice-versa.
To do this, we must understand and undertake the difficult project of "forc[ing]
privacy to go public," as Kendall Thomas wrote in his seminal article.37° We cannot
adopt Lawrence's rigorous drawing of the boundaries between private and public, or
internal and external sovereignty, as I have argued, but we must go further. To do this,
I draw on Helen Stacy's notion of "relational sovereignty."37' This particular type of
sovereignty emerges out of the growing recognition that the existing frameworks of
external and internal sovereignty were far too limiting.372 She argues that perspectives
that define sovereignty as a receding phenomenon tend to overdetermine the division
between public and private, and, as a result, tend to presume that "government's over-
riding objective is to step back from 'private' activity, rather than step in to facilitate
it. ' '373 Rather than espouse this view, Stacy proposes redefining sovereignty so that it
366 Id. at 68.
367 Harris, supra note 357, at 594.
368 Id.
369 See Goodman, supra note 115, at 697.
370 Thomas, supra note 43, at 1443.
371 Stacy, supra note 181.
372 See id. at 2031.
373 Id. at 2045.
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recognizes how the public and private, national and international, are deeply connected,
rather than bordered entities. As she writes, "Globalization creates a dynamic inter-
change that has enlarged the scope of all forms of relationships - economic, political,
social, cultural, and religious - between those living in the United States and those
living outside its borders. '374 As examples, Stacy cites Anne-Marie Slaughter's and
Harold Koh' s work, which views globalization as a powerful tool in creating ways for
private citizens to influence their world; one powerful example that she offers is the
example of courts who seek guidance in court decisions from other jurisdictions.375
Koh, too, recognizes globalization as a new world order that supplants the previous
system of sovereignty; as part of this trend, he draws attention to the existence of in-
dividuals who face multiple loyalties, to "sub-national ethnic groups and broader global,
religious, ethnic, cultural, and issue-based movements. 3 76 Within this context, indi-
viduals face a broad array of loyalties - some corporate, some private, and some com-
munity-based - and each intersect powerfully with national boundaries.377 While one
might conclude that the nation-state might be shrinking, or perhaps becoming less rele-
vant, Stacy argues, powerfully, that sovereignty is not receding, but rather changing in
response to the transformation of the social contract that reflects the changing condi-
tions of globalization and the growth of international human rights.378
A very influential work by Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes discusses an emer-
ging principle that relates to Stacy' s in many respects: "the new sovereignty." '379 Their
principle of a new sovereignty focuses on a robust conception of membership in a
174 Id. at 2031.
171 See id. at 2041 (citing Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, Judicial Globali-
zation, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1115 (2000)).
376 See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century,
46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 293, 303 (2002).
171 See Stacy, supra note 181, at 2043 (citing Koh, supra note 376, at 305).
378 Id. at 2044. Consider, for example, the large number of international sources mentioned
in Lawrence-Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and
Prostitution (1963). See, e.g., P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 197;
Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988);
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 195-96 (2003) (referring to how the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act aligned U.S. terms with
the international standard adopted under the Berne Convention and how the Copyright Term
Extension Act harmonizes with the copyright term adopted by the European Union in 1993).
For more discussion of the role of international law in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, see ge-
nerally Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a Door Ajar: An Overview of the
Evolving and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in Human Rights and International
Law Jurisprudence, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 103, 126 (2005); Janet Koven Levit, Going Public With
Transnational Law: The 2002-2003 Supreme Court Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 155 (2003).
179 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COM-
PLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995). A key development,
which relates to the new sovereignty, involves the development of legal scholarship questioning
the role of the state in comparison to the emergence of transnational norm development. See,
e.g., Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. "War on
Terrorism", 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 47, 59 (2004); Paul Schiff Berman, From Inter-
national Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2005).
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global community, which Anne-Marie Slaughter has described as a positive conception
of sovereignty, which empowers states to join in collective efforts to address global and
regional issues.380 As she further explains:
In this context, where the defining features of the international
system are connection rather than separation, interaction rather than
isolation, and institutions rather than free space, sovereignty as
autonomy makes no sense. The new sovereignty is status, mem-
bership, "connection to the rest of the world and the political
ability to be an actor within it."
381
The recharacterization of sovereignty is dynamically poised to consider sovereignty,
less as a function of control, and more as a set of responsibilities that affect both internal
functions and external duties.382 In this way, the authors posit that an international
regime does more than simply reduce transaction costs, but instead takes on an active
role in "modifying preferences, generating new options, persuading the parties to move
toward increasing compliance with regime norms, and guiding the evolution of the
normative structure in the direction of the overall objectives of the regime., 38 3
To accomplish this goal, Stacy proposes a framework of responsible governance,
one that embraces a framework of representative democracy, an assumption of full
agency that rests with the citizen, and a sovereign's obligation to the social, economic,
and cultural rights of the citizen as well. 38 We see elements of this approach in the
Court's observations in Lawrence that majoritarian morality serves as insufficient
grounds for regulating same-sex sexuality.385 Because Lawrence operates without and
outside of a stated requirement of expressive identity, it offers us a richer and more
complicated picture of the private self. In doing so, perhaps a utopian reading of
Lawrence offers us the ability to consider gay rights and sexual identity in terms of the
need to reckon with the relevancy of categories like race, class, ethnicity, religion, and
disability, among others. 3' At the same time, to the extent that such considerations
affirm the private at the cost of the public, it fails to take up a more radical approach,
and instead ignores, and in fact perpetuates, lasting inequalities in public spaces for
sexual minorities.
Yet perhaps Lawrence's limitations, as I have suggested, signal the need for a more
robust conception of intersectionality between the private and public as well. Here, its
offering of a theory of sexual sovereignty decries a need for the recognition of the
380 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes
of UN Reform, 99 AM.J. INT'L L. 619 (2005).
38l See id. at 629.
382 Id. at 630-31.
383 CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 379, at 229.
31 Stacy, supra note 181, at 2048.
385 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) ("Moral disapproval of this group, like
a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review
under the Equal Protection Clause.").
386 Bond, supra note 218, at 74.
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intersections between public and private spaces for empowerment with respect to sexual
autonomy, just as it requires a similar recognition of the interaction between positive
and negative conceptions of liberty. In other words, Lawrence must, to be truly
effective, take up the call of intersectionality - and recognize that empowering the
private domain of sexuality requires a fuller protection of the "publics" of sexuality -
whether they affect one's outward expression, one's choice of partner, one's sexual
activities in public, or one's associational choices.
By recognizing a dynamic, rather than static relationship between the private and
public aspects of sexuality, future courts interpreting Lawrence might look more closely
at how, for example, empowerment in private spaces affects, and thereby lends support
to, equality in public spaces, and vice versa. Charles Taylor's formulation of recog-
nition argues that the discourse of recognition requires both a dialogue in the private,
intimate sphere, as well as the public one.387 The public sphere, he writes, concentrates
on the notion of "a politics of equal recognition," 3 comprising the equal dignity and
universal equality of all citizens, which requires the equalizing of rights and entitlements,
as well as the notion that the politics of equal dignity require not only an "identical
basket of rights and immunities, 389 but also a seminal principle that correlates with the
"politics of difference,''390 namely that each individual or group carries a unique,
distinct identity that is separate from everyone else.391' Along these lines, consider
Katherine Franke's treatment of the case handed down by the Constitutional Court in
South Africa, which found the Sexual Offenses Act to be unconstitutional on equality,
dignity, and privacy grounds. In that case, Justice Ackermann compared the law's
treatment of a kiss between two males to a kiss between two females or a heterosexual
couple at a public gathering.3 2 Under the law's treatment of a same-sex sexual act in
a public place, Justice Ackermann observed that the male couple would be guilty of an
offense, even though the lesbian and heterosexual couples were not.393 Commenting
on this striking observation, Franke argues:
What is remarkable about this hypothetical is the degree to which
its absurdity does not depend on a conception of privacy. The kiss
is in public, in front of an audience, and is explicitly erotic in na-
ture. It is the disparate legal treatment of similarly situated kissers
that strikes Justice Ackermann as absurd and unfair, not the loca-
tion in which the same-sex kissing takes place.
By reading the dignity right in light of an equality right, the
court in National Coalition was able to articulate the constitutional
infirmity of the Sexual Offenses Act in a way that differs sub-
stantially from what the Court accomplished in Lawrence. While
387 Taylor, supra note 77, at 37.
388 id.
389 Id. at 38.
390 Id.
391 See id. at 37-38.
392 See Franke, supra note 4, at 1406.
393 See id.
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Justice Ackermann foregrounds equality and dignity and back-
grounds privacy in his opinion, Justice Kennedy foregrounds pri-
vacy, backgrounds dignity, and rejects the equality argument alto-
gether. With a change of emphasis, Justice Kennedy could have
made Lawrence turn on a recognition of how sodomy laws inflict
a badge of inferiority, indeed a badge of the closet, on gay men and
lesbians.l
Here, as Franke suggests, I would argue for a more dynamic - indeed, intersectional
- picture of the relationship between private and public in the wake of Lawrence. It
calls for a realization that acceptance in public space is equally vital to a flourishing,
healthy identity in private space, and vice versa.
CONCLUSION
In the end, however, as Lawrence's progeny has demonstratively shown, a politics
of privacy, to be effective, must be melded to a broad notion of equality in citizenship
if the concept of true sexual autonomy is to be at all effective. Whether Lawrence
accomplishes this goal on a global scale depends on context and community, as I have
suggested; but it also represents a dynamic shift in the global conversation beyond
moralistic principle towards larger goals of liberty, autonomy, and tolerance. In short,
Lawrence reflects the dynamic, converging, and sometimes conflicting relationship
between culture and law, but it does so on a grand, global scale that demonstrates the
need for drawing upon other jurisdictions to define our conceptions of citizenship. At
the same time, it also demonstrates the potential for law to transcend its limitations, and
to offer to the public a normative vision that fails to distinguish between gay, straight,
lesbian, or bisexual in protecting the right to seek self-fulfillment and expression. That
in itself is a crucial triumph which signals an unlimited host of possibilities.
" Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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